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NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, FOR-PROFIT
CORPORATIONS, AND THE HHS MANDATE:
WHY THE MANDATE DOES NOT SATISFY RFRA'S
REQUIREMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2012, the federal government spawned an enormously divisive issue when it promulgated a regulation that requires certain
employers to provide contraception coverage to their employees
without cost-sharing. The mandate's supporters see it as an important step in expanding access to vital healthcare for women,1
whereas its detractors see it as an attempt by the government to
force them into violating their deeply held religious beliefs.2 In a
clash between values, the mandate favors access to contraception
over the concerns of religious groups.
At times the debate between these conflicting viewpoints has
taken on almost apocalyptic proportions. At a prominent prochoice organization's meeting, the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services, Kathleen Sebelius, declared that
"[w]e are in a war" over the mandate and access to contraceptives.3 On the other side, Representative Mike Kelly compared the
date that the mandate went into effect, August 1, 2012, with December 7, Pearl Harbor Day, and September 11 as another "day

1. See, e.g., Denying Coverage of Contraceptives Harms Women, NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW
CTR. 1-2 (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/denying-covg-ofcont-harms_women_- 081312_pdf.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Comments from Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Assoc. Gen. Sec'y & Gen.
Counsel, U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, to the Dept. of Health & Human Servs. 1-4 (May
15, 2012), http://www.usccb.org/aboutlgeneral-counsel/rulemaking/upload/comments-onadvance-notice-of-proposed-rulemaking-on-preventive-services- 12-05-15.pdf [hereinafter
Comments from Anthony R. Picarello, Jr.].
3. See William McGurn, The Church of Kathleen Sebelius, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2011,
at A19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that will live in infamy" because of the "attack on our religious
freedom."4
Despite the extreme rhetoric from both sides, this comment is
not concerned with which side in this debate has the better argument in a normative sense because Congress has already made
that value judgment. By enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), Congress has already placed its finger on the
side of the scale of religious freedom. Regardless of whether the
mandate is good policy, it must comply with the provisions of
RFRA' This comment does not argue that the mandate is unwise
or unjust. Whether the mandate is wise or just are not the questions the courts will address when religious groups challenge the
mandate. Instead, courts will determine whether the mandate
can surmount the high hurdles placed in front of it by RFRA. Indeed, in suits to enjoin the government from enforcing the mandate, nonprofit organizations and for-profit corporations have already forced courts to grapple with whether the mandate can
meet RFRA's requirements.' At this time, only one of those courts
has reached the merits of a mandate challenge, so the future of
those cases remains in flux.7 Ultimately, this comment concludes
that, for better or worse, the mandate will fall short.
Section II provides background information on the mandate
and the convoluted process by which the Departments of Health
and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury ("the government"
or "the Departments") promulgated it. It begins with a brief discussion of the relevant portions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") that relate to the mandate.' Then, Section II describes the mandate's requirements and its passage.
Finally, it chronicles how various religious groups reacted to the

4. Aram A. Schvey, Much Ado About Nothing?: Religious Freedom and the Contraceptive-Coverage Benefit, 39 HuM. RTS. 11, 11 (2013).
5. The mandate must also satisfy the First Amendment of the Constitution and the
Administrative Procedure Act; however, this comment only asks whether the mandate can
meet RFRA's requirements.
6. See infra notes 139, 184 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
8. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2713, 124
Stat. 119, 131 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (Supp. V 2011)). A full discussion of
the ACA is outside the scope of this comment. Nonetheless, the government promulgated
the mandate pursuant to the provisions of the ACA, and provisions of the ACA provide
penalties for non-compliance with the mandate. For those reasons, I introduce the ACA to
the minimum extent necessary for the reader to comprehend the mandate.
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mandate and the government's efforts to accommodate these objections through the advance notice of proposed rulemaking, the
temporary enforcement safe harbor, and the February 1, 2013
proposed rules.
Following the introduction to the mandate in Section II, Section III analyzes RFRA-based legal challenges to the mandate
that plaintiffs have brought thus far. Though litigation over the
mandate remains in a preliminary stage, certain trends have appeared in the limited number of decisions issued by federal district courts and courts of appeals. Section III discusses those
trends as they relate to both the nonprofit organizations and forprofit corporations that have turned to the courts for relief from
the mandate.
Finally, Section IV argues that the mandate violates RFRA by
placing a substantial burden on the free exercise rights of both
nonprofit organizations and for-profit corporations with religious
objections to it, while failing to meet the compelling interest test.
That section begins by providing background information on
RFRA and the compelling interest test it adopted. It then evaluates whether the government can prove that the mandate complies with the compelling interest test. It cannot. The mandate
places a substantial burden on the religious exercise of both nonprofit organizations and for-profit corporations by forcing them to
violate their religious beliefs by providing contraceptives coverage
or pay substantial penalties.9 Although the Supreme Court has
not yet answered the question of whether a for-profit corporation
can exercise religion, the similarity between those corporations
and nonprofit corporations indicates that for-profit corporations
have religious exercise rights under RFRA. 0 The government will
not be able to prove that the mandate can satisfy the strict scrutiny RFRA requires. The mandate will founder on the shoals of
RFRA's compelling interest requirement because the array of exceptions to the mandate undermine any otherwise compelling interest.

9.
10.

See discussion infra Section IV.B.1.
See discussion infra notes 322, 324-45 and accompanying text.
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II. THE MANDATE AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS BY WHICH
THE GOVERNMENT PROMULGATED IT

A lengthy administrative sparring match between the government and religious organizations generated the current permutation of the mandate and the multitude of law suits alleging that
the mandate violates RFRA. A complex series of rulemakings and
amendments to those rules created the mandate that is now in effect. The evolution of the mandate and its exceptions embodied a
dialogue between the government and groups opposed to the
mandate over whether the mandate should apply to employers
with religious beliefs opposed to the mandate.
The dialogue began after the government issued interim final
rules that included contraceptives coverage as a preventive service that employers must provide their employees under the
ACA." Opposition from religiously affiliated employers led the
government to amend these interim final rules to contain an exemption for certain "religious employers."12 However, many nonexempt employers criticized this religious employer exemption as
too narrow. 3 When the departments solidified the interim final
rules into final rules, those regulations included the narrowlydefined religious employer exception; however, those final rules
also promised that the government would amend the rules to accommodate a wider range of employers who opposed the mandate." Additionally, after finalizing the mandate, the government
created a "temporary enforcement safe harbor" that would prevent the government from enforcing the mandate against nonprofit organizations until the government had amended the rules
as promised."6

11. See Interim Final Rules Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726 (July 19, 2010).
12. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012).
13. See, e.g., Comments from Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., supranote 2, at 1-4.
14. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at
8728.
15. Id.
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This promised amendment process failed to satisfy the mandate's detractors.16 The government initiated the process of
amending the mandate to accommodate more employers with religious objections through an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking ("ANPRMI'). 17 The ANPRM requested comments on how
the government should accommodate employers opposed to the
mandate, but it did not include any concrete proposals. 8 Almost a
year elapsed after the ANPRM with no government action.' 9 After
that long period of inaction, the government proposed new rules
to formally amend the mandate."
After every step during the mandate's progression, employers
unsatisfied with pace or results of the administrative process
sought relief from the courts.2' When the government could not
alleviate the concerns of employers opposed to the mandate for religious reasons, those employers sued to enjoin the mandate under RFRA."2 The process through which the government promulgated the mandate would ultimately dictate how courts decided
nonprofit organizations' RFRA challenges and why courts dismissed many of those cases on procedural grounds.23 The government's refusal to accommodate for-profit organizations during
the course of the mandate's development would also affect how
courts decided those RFRA cases.24
A. The Statutory Backdrop Authorizing the Mandate
As part of its expansive statutory scheme, section 2713 of the
ACA requires certain employers' health insurance plans to provide coverage for certain preventive health services without costsharing by the employee.2 5 Employee health insurance plans are

16. See, e.g., Comments from Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., supranote 2, at 1-4.
17. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501,
16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012).
18. Id.
19. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77
Fed. Reg. 8456, 8458 (Feb. 6, 2013).
20. Id. at 8456.
21. See discussion infra Section III.
22. See infra notes 139, 184 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Section III.A.
24. See infra Section III.B.
25. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2713, 124 Stat.
119, 131 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (Supp. V 2011)).
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covered by the ACA's provisions relating to "group health plans." 6
Under the ACA, group health insurance plans must provide
women covered by the plan with the minimum amount of preventive services included in guidelines issued by the Health Resources Services Administration ("HRSA"), 27 an agency within the
Department of Health and Human Services." Accordingly, employers offering health insurance plans must provide their female
employees with the preventive services that HRSA enumerates in
its guidelines."

Though the ACA generally requires employers' plans to cover
the HRSA mandated services for women, section 2713 does not
apply to all employers' plans because the ACA exempts some employers.2 " For example, the preventive services requirement does
not apply to grandfathered plans. 1 The government considers a
plan grandfathered if at least one individual was enrolled in the
plan on March 23, 2010, and the plan has maintained its grandfathered status 12

26. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91 (2006) ('"The term 'group health plan' means 'an employee welfare benefit plan... to the extent that the plan provides medical care (as defined in
paragraph (2)) and including items and services paid for as medical care) to employees or
their dependents (as defined under the terms of the plan) directly or through insurance,
reimbursement, or otherwise."').
27. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 2713, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (Supp. V
2011) ("A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual
health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose
any cost sharing requirements for.., with respect to women, such additional preventive
care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive
guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration for purposes of
this paragraph.").
28. The HRSA is an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services
responsible for improving access to healthcare for the "uninsured, isolated or medically
vulnerable." Implementing Our Strategic Plan, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN. 1,
http://www.hrsa.gov/about/strategicplanimplementation.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
29. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (Supp. V
2011).
30. See FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part V and Mental Health
Parity Implementation, U.S. DEP'T LABOR 4 (Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.dol.gov/eb
salpdf/faq-aca5.pdf.
31. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1251, 124 Stat. at 161-62 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18011(a)(2), (e) (Supp. V 2011)) ("[With respect to a group health plan
or health insurance coverage in which an individual was enrolled on March 23, 2010, this
subtitle and subtitle A (and the amendments made by such subtitles) shall not apply to
such plan or coverage, regardless of whether the individual renews such coverage after
such date.... In this title, the term 'grandfathered health plan' means any group health
plan or health insurance coverage to which this section applies.").
32. See Preservation of Right to Maintain Existing Coverage, 45 C.F.R. §
147.140(a)(1)(i) (2012).
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An employer can maintain the grandfathered status of its plan
so long as the plan has continuously covered someone since
March 23, 2010, and the employer has not modified it.13 Modifications that eliminate a plan's grandfathered status include entering into a new plan, certificate, or contract of insurance after
March 23, 2010, and effective before November 15, 2010; eliminating benefits to diagnose or treat a particular condition; increasing cost-sharing requirements such as co-payments; decreasing the employer's contribution rate; and altering certain annual
limits.34 In short, if the employer's plan satisfies the foregoing criteria, namely that the plan is sufficiently old and the employer
has not substantially changed it, the government will grandfather
the plan and exempt it from any regulations requiring that plan
to provide women with the services listed in the HRSA guidelines.
Along with grandfathered plans, the government has also exempted small employers' plans because the ACA only penalizes
large employer plans that fail to comply with the ACA's provisions.3" The Act defines a large employer as one with at least fifty
full-time employees. 36 Furthermore, under the ACA, the government will fine only large employers for failing to comply with its
provisions." Accordingly, the government has effectively exempted employers with less than fifty full-time employees from the requirement that employers' plans include the services in the
HRSA guidelines because the government will not fine those employers if they elect to disregard section 2713.
For those employers with neither grandfathered plans nor
small employer status, the penalty provisions of the ACA impose
substantial fines on employers that do not comply with section
2713 and the ACA's other provisions.38 If a non-exempt employer
with fifty or more employees fails to provide the preventive services required by section 2713, the ACA penalizes that employer

33. See id. ("Grandfatheredhealth plan coverage means coverage provided by a group
health plan, or a group or individual health insurance issuer, in which an individual was
enrolled on March 23, 2010 (for as long as it maintains that status under the rules of this
section).").
34. See id. §§ 147.140(a)(1)(ii), 147.140(g).
35. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (Supp. V 2011).
36. See id. § 4980H(a), (c)(2)(A).
37. See id. § 4980H(a).
38. See id. § 4980H(a).
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by imposing a fine.3" The government will assess an annual fine
on the non-compliant employer of $2000 multiplied by the number of the employer's full-time employees less thirty.40 Thus, if an
employer maintains fifty employees but fails to provide its female
employees with the services outlined in HRSA's guidelines, the
government will fine that employer $40,000 per year. 4' The government will also tax the employer $100 per day per employee for
each day an employee is not covered. 4' These penalties form the
basis for which plaintiffs have contested the mandate under
RFRA.4'
The ACA created the groundwork for the mandate and, therefore, the RFRA challenges to it. Section 2713 authorized the departments to promulgate the mandate, and the ACA's penalty
provisions provide the teeth that make the government's regulations truly a mandate for some employers, but not for others.
B. The Regulations Creating the Mandate's Burden
On July 19, 2010, the Department of Health and Human Services exercised its authority under section 2713 and issued an interim final rule with a request for comments to implement the
preventive services requirement of the ACA.4 4 Those interim final
rules, effective September 23, 2010, stated that the Department
of Health and Human Services was developing the guidelines for
the preventive services that the ACA required employers to provide with respect to women.45 While the July 19, 2010 interim final rule did not specifically state which preventive services the
government required an employer to provide, it did establish that
the government would determine those required services by Au-

39. See id. § 4980H(a), (c)(2).
40. Id. § 4980H(c)(1), (2)(D).
41. In equation form: (50 [the number of full-times employees] - 30) x $2,000 =
$40,000.
42. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(a), (b) (2006).
43. See infra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
44. Interim Final Rules Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726, 41,728 (July 19, 2010).
45. See id.
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gust 1, 2011.46 The guidelines HRSA eventually developed would
become the basis of the mandate."
To determine what preventive services for women the mandate
should require, HRSA commissioned a study by the Institute of
Medicine ("IOMT ) and ultimately adopted its recommendation
that the preventive services regulations should include coverage
of contraceptives. 8 The IOM is an independent organization established in 1970 under the charter of the National Academy of
Sciences.49 As part of its recommendations to HRSA, IOM suggested that the mandate cover "[t]he full range of Food and Drug
Administration-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization
procedures, and patient education and counseling for women with
reproductive capacity."5 The contraception methods approved by
the FDA include diaphragms, contraceptive pills, intrauterine devices, and the emergency contraceptives Plan B and Ella.' On
August 1, 2011, HRSA adopted IOM's recommendations and included coverage for FDA approved contraceptive methods in the
enumeration of preventive services for women that covered employers must provide. 2
Three days after HRSA adopted IOM's recommendation that
preventive services for women include access to contraceptives,
the government responded to concerns from religious groups by
amending the rules. The government issued an interim final rule
and request for comments that amended the July 19, 2010 interim final rules to accommodate employers with religious beliefs
opposed to providing access to contraceptives." In response to

46. Id.
47. See id. at 41,727-28.
48. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Affordable Care Act
Ensures Women Receive Preventive Services at No Additional Cost (Aug. 1, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/08/201l080lb.html [hereinafter Press Release].
49. See Clinical Preventive Services for Women, INST. OF MEDICINE 1, 4 (July 2011),
http://www.iom.edu/-media/FilesReport%20Files/2011/Clinical-Preventive-Services-forWomen- Closing-the-Gaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreportbriefupdated2.pdf.
50. Id. at 3.
51. See Birth Control Guide, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 1-13 (Aug. 2012), http://www.
fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublicationsUCM282014.
pdf.
52. See Press Release, supra note 48; Women's Preventive Services: Required Health
Plan Coverage Guide, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womens guidelines/#footnote2 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
53. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg.

1310

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1301

comments to the rules arguing that requiring religious group
health plans sponsored by religious employers to cover contraception could impinge upon those employers' religious freedom, the
August 3 amendment authorized the departments to "exempt certain religious employers from the [HRSA] Guidelines where contraceptive services are concerned." 4
The amended interim final rules created a narrow exemption
for religious employers designed to balance the government's interest in expanding access to contraceptives with employers' religious freedom. Under the definition of a religious employer established in the amended interim rule, a religious employer must: (1)
have the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employ people sharing its religious belief; (3) primarily serve
people sharing its religious beliefs; and (4) exist as a nonprofit organization under certain sections of the Internal Revenue Code.5"
Because of the fourth prong of that definition, essentially only
churches and religious orders qualify for the exemption.56 The
government adopted this definition of a religious employer to balance its desire to extend coverage of contraceptives under the
HRSA guidelines to as many women as possible with the need to
recognize "the unique relationship" between religious employers
and their employees in religious positions.5 7
The amendment also solicited further comments concerning the
definition of a religious employer." The government's request for
comments concerning the definition of a "religious employer" for
the purposes of the mandate's religious employer exemption undoubtedly succeeded-the government received more than
200,000 comments. 9 Some commenters approved of the balance

46,621 (Aug. 3, 2011).
54. Id. at 46,623.
55. Id. ("(1) Ha[ve] the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employo persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serven persons who share its
religious tenets; and (4) [be] a nonprofit organization under section 6033(a)(1) and section
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Code.").
56. The nonprofit organizations referred to in the interim final rule include "churches,
their integrated auxiliaries and conventions or associations of churches" and "the exclusively religious activities of any religious order." 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A) (2006).
57. Group Health Plans and Health Insuranec Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. at
46,623.
58. See id.
59. Group Health Plans and Heath Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725,
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struck by the current definition and thought that the exemption
should be left as defined in the interim final rules.6" Others suggested that the exemption be eliminated entirely because of the
importance of expanding access to contraceptives to as many
women as possible.61 Still others contended that the definition of a
"religious employer" should be expanded to include more religiously-affiliated employers.62
Despite the massive array of comments it received, the government did not alter the interim final rules. 3 On February 15,
2012, the government adopted the interim final rule and the
amendment creating the religious employer exemption without
any change.64 Accordingly, the religious employer exemption covered only those organizations that met the criteria the government had established in the interim final rule, notwithstanding
the range of comments the government received concerning that
definition.
The government finalized the rule without altering the religious employer exemption in order to accommodate religious
groups while expanding access to contraceptives as much as possible. By limiting the religious employer exemption to the definition set forth in the interim final rules, the government argued
that the exemption would not undermine the benefits associated
with the contraception coverage mandate.65 Under the final rule,
a religious employer must primarily employ persons who share
that employer's religious tenets.66 In the government's view, the
employees of these religious employers would not be likely to use
contraception even if given cost-free access to it because, by definition, those employees would share the religious employer's belief that the use of contraception was immoral. 7

8726 (Feb. 15, 2012).
60. See id. at 8727.
61. Id.at 8726.
62. See id. at 8727.
63. See id. at 8725.
64. Id. ("[F]inalize[d], without change, [the] interim final regulations authorizing the
exemption of group health plans and group health insurance coverage sponsored by certain religious employers from having to cover certain preventive health services.").
65. Id. at 8727, 8728.
66. See Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B)(3)
(2012).
67. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at
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Conversely, the government contended that expanding the exemption to include more employers would lessen the mandate's
expansion of access to contraceptives.6 8 If the religious employer
exemption did not require the employees to primarily share their
employer's religious tenets, a greater number of those employees
would be likely to seek contraceptives. At the same time, because
the mandate's limitation on cost-sharing would not apply to the
exempt employer, those employees would be more likely to pay
out of pocket to receive contraceptive services.6 9 According to the
government, expanding the definition of a religious employer
could allow an employer to impose its religious belief that contraception is immoral upon employees who do not share that same
belief.0 In short, the government did not alter the definition of a
religious employer because of a concern that doing so would reduce the number of employees who both had cost-free access to
contraception and were also likely to use it.
Although the government did not expand the definition of a religious employer to include more religiously-affiliated employers-as some commenters suggested-the government attempted
to accommodate these employers by creating a temporary enforcement safe harbor and by announcing its intent to alter the
mandate's religious employer exemption in a future rulemaking."
The final rule created a safe harbor of one year for certain nonexempt, nonprofit organizations. The departments issued this
safe harbor contemporaneously with promulgation of the final
regulations in an HHS bulletin.7 2 That bulletin stated that although the regulations required coverage of the recommended
women's preventive services without cost sharing for plan years
beginning on or after August 1, 2012, the departments would not
enforce the mandate against certain non-exempt employers until
the first plan year beginning on or after August 1, 2013."

8728.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Bulletin, Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor 1-2 & n.1 (Aug. 15, 2012), http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/prevservices-guidance-08152012.pdf [hereinaafter Bulletin].
73. Id. at 2-3.
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To qualify for the temporary enforcement safe harbor, an employer must meet certain qualifications. Employers must (1) be
organized and operating as a nonprofit entity; (2) have a plan
that did not provide at least some subset of the contraceptive services required by the final rule from February 10, 2012 (the date
the government promulgated the mandate) because of the employer's religious beliefs; (3) issue a notification, included in the
safe harbor guidelines, that indicates that the employer's plan
will not provide contraceptives coverage; and (4) self-certify to the
government that it has met those previous three criteria."4 If an
employer does not meet these criteria, the safe harbor is not
available, and the government will enforce the mandate against it
for plan years beginning on or after August 1, 2012.
The temporary enforcement safe harbor has partially shaped
the outcome of lawsuits filed by both nonprofit organizations and
for-profit plaintiffs. Because the safe harbor prevented the government from enforcing the mandate against nonprofit religious
organizations that followed the safe harbor guidelines' selfcertification procedure, many courts dismissed nonprofit cases on
the grounds that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue because the mandate had not injured them.7" In other words, the
safe harbor provisions led many courts to dismiss nonprofit organizations' claims for procedural reasons without regard to the
merits of their RFRA claims. Conversely, for-profit organizations
did not face this procedural hurdle because the government has
never considered exempting them.76 The absence of this hurdle

Id. at 3. An organization is exempt if it meets all of the following criteria:
1. The organization is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity. 2. From
February 10, 2012 onward, the group health plan established or maintained
by the organization has consistently not provided all or the same subset of
contraceptive coverage otherwise required at any point ... because of the religious beliefs of the organization. 3. As detailed below, the group health plan
established or maintained by the organization (or another entity on behalf of
the plan, such as a health insurance issuer or thirdparty administrator) must
provide to participants the attached notice, as described below, which states
that some or all contraceptive coverage will not be provided under the plan
for the first plan year beginning on or after August 1, 2012.] 4. The organization self-certifies that it satisfies criteria 1-3 above, and documents its selfcertification in accordance with the procedures detailed herein.
Id. See id. at 6, for the required notice employers must provide to plan participants. See
id. at 7, for the safe harbor certification procedures.
75. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 106, 184-89 and accompanying text.
74.
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helps explain why courts have granted for-profit corporations relief from the mandate, while dismissing cases brought by nonprofit organizations.77
The final rule also established that the government would attempt to accommodate religious objections to the mandate during
the safe harbor period by issuing a new rulemaking designed to
"develop alternative ways of providing contraceptive coverage
without cost sharing with respect to non-exempted, non-profit religious organizations with religious objections to such coverage. ,,78
More specifically, the departments would initiate an additional
rulemaking to alter the mandate to allow religious employers to
avoid covering contraceptives while requiring insurers to offer
preventive services coverage directly to plan participants.7 ' The
government further stated that the rulemaking would be informed by how state law contraceptive coverage mandates have
treated religious employers."s
C. The ANPRM
As promised on February 10, 2012, the government began the
process of amending the mandate shortly after it promulgated it.
The government took its first step by publishing an ANPRM in
the Federal Register on March 21, 2012.81 Although this was a
step in the right direction, an ANPRM is not equivalent to a

77. See supra notes 151-59, 184-89, and accompanying text.
78. Group Health Plans and Heath Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725,
8728 (Feb. 15, 2012).
79. Id. (stating that the government would "initiate a rulemaking to require issuers to
offer insurance without contraception coverage to [a religious employer] and simultaneously to offer contraceptive coverage directly to the employer's plan participants").
80. Id. Twenty-eight states have some form of contraceptive coverage mandate under
state law. Id. However, it is not clear that the federal government could simply follow the
example of state contraception coverage requirements to avoid unduly infringing upon the
religious freedoms of religious employers. RFRA does not apply to the states. See City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). However, RFRA does apply to the federal government. See Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
424 (2006). Accordingly, though a state contraception requirement might be valid because
RFRA does not apply to the states, an identical federal mandate might not be valid because RFRA applies to the federal government.
81. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501,
16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012).
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s Furthermore, the
rulemaking and is not binding in and of itself."
ANPRM did not specify how the government would alter the religious employer exemption. 3 That said, the ANPRM was a preliminary step toward modifying the religious employer exemption to
the mandate because it, at minimum, reiterated the government's
intention to propose amendments to the mandate's regulations in
order to create alternative ways for women employed by religious
organizations to receive access to contraceptives without requiring those organizations to cover religiously objectionable contraceptives.84 The ANPRM stated two goals, maintaining contraceptive coverage without cost sharing and protecting religious
organizations from having to arrange for contraceptives coverage
or pay for that coverage."

To achieve these goals, the ANPRM outlined possible options to
accommodate a greater number of religious employers and requested comments on those options. These options focused on how
the government could create a system whereby an independent
entity would assume responsibility for providing cost-free contraceptive coverage." Under the first option, for religious employers
that purchase insurance coverage from a health insurance issuer,
the insurance company would offer the employer a plan that did
not include contraceptives coverage and would separately provide
plan participants with contraceptives coverage without cost sharing.87 Under the second option, for self-insured employers, the

82. The Administrative Procedure Act does not contain any reference to ANPRMs. See
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006); Bridget C.E. Dooling, Legal Issues in E.Rulemaking, 63 ADMIN. L.
REV. 893, 897-98 (2011). Nonetheless, "[algencies sometimes use an [ANPRM] to gather
early feedback on regulatory issues." Id. at 897; William McGeveran, Leili Fatehi & Pari
McGarraugh, Deidentificationand Reidentification in Returning Individual Findingsfrom
Biobank and Secondary Research, 13 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 485, 504 n.97 (2012).
83. See Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3:12CV253RLM, 2012 WL 6756332, at *1
(N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012).
84. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 16,501
('"This [ANPRM] announce[d] the intention of the Departments ... to propose amendments to regulations regarding certain preventive health services ... [to] establish alternative ways to fulfill the requirements of section 2713 . . .when health coverage is sponsored or arranged by a religious organization that objects to the coverage of contraceptive
services."). In the ANPRM, the government referred to the ANPRM as "the first step toward promulgating ...amended final regulations." Id. at 16,503.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 16,505.
87. See id.
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ANPRM proposed requiring third party administrators to provide
or arrange for contraceptive coverage without cost sharing."
In short, the ANPRM was a preliminary step through which
the government solicited comments on a number of possible solutions to accommodate non-exempt, nonprofit organizations with
religious objections to providing contraceptive services without
cost-sharing. Critics claimed the government did not go far
enough by simply publishing the ANPRM because the ANPRM
did nothing to bind the government-it had no legal force.8" The
government had to follow up with an additional proposed rulemaking in order to amend the mandate."0 Even though the
ANPRM did not bind the government, courts that would eventually adjudicate nonprofit organizations' RFRA claims would dismiss those cases because the ANPRM began the process of
amending the mandate. 9 The courts had dismissed many of those
cases when, after almost one year, the departments formally proposed the rule to alter the mandate that the ANPRM had anticipated."
D. The "Next Step": The February 1, 2013 ProposedRules
On February 1, 2013, the Obama administration followed
through on its promise to amend the mandate by issuing a notice
of proposed rulemaking that would expand the number of organizations covered by the religious employer exemption." The February 2013 proposed rules would alter the religious employer exemption, create an additional accommodation for certain "eligible
organizations," and provide third party coverage for contracep-

88. Id. at 16,506 (providing that the employer must provide each third party administrator written notice that the employer "will not contribute to the funding of contraceptive
services").
89. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius, No. 12 Civ. 2542(BMC),
2012 WL 6042864, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012).
90. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
91. See supra Section III.A.1.
92. See, e.g., Persico v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-123-SJM, 2013 WL 228200, at *9-13, *21
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2013); Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 11-cv-03350-CMA BNB,
2013 WL 93188, at *7, *9 (D. Colo. Jan. 7, 2013).
93. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Administration Issues Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Recommended Preventive Services Policy (Feb. 1, 2013),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/02/20130201a.html; see also Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8461
(Feb. 6, 2013).
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tives for those organizations' insured group health plans or selfinsured group health plans.94
The government issued the February 2013 Proposed Rules to
follow through on the process initiated by the ANPRM. In response to the ANPRM's request for comments on the religious
employer exemption, the departments received approximately
200,000 comments from a range of individuals and organizations,
including religiously affiliated educational institutions, health
care organizations, charities, and associations; third party administrators and plan service providers; civil rights organizations;
consumer groups; secular organizations; states; women's rights
and reproductive health advocacy organizations; and private citizens.95 Commenters expressed concern that the mandate contained too narrow a religious employer definition because many
religious employers have purposes that extend beyond the inculcation of religious belief, serve people from different faiths, or
hire people of different faiths.96 Some non-exempt employers stated that they would cease to provide health insurance coverage to
their employees if the mandate's religious employer definition
remained unchanged.97 Other comments argued that the mandate
infringed upon religious exercise rights under the First Amendment and RFRA.9" Conversely, some commenters supported the
current definition of a religious employer or argued that the definition should be narrowed or eliminated to expand access to contraceptives.9 9
After considering these comments, the departments' February
2013 proposed rules replaced the current definition of a religious
employer with a new definition designed to accommodate religious employers that would qualify under the former definition,
but for the fact that they provide benevolent services to people of

94. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. at 8456-57; Women's Preventive Services Coverage and Religious Organizations,
CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/factsheets/
womens-preven-02012013.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
95. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 8459.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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different faiths or employ persons of different faiths."' Under the
new definition, a 'religious employer' is an organization that is
organized and operates as a nonprofit entity and is referred to in
section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (a)(3)(A)(iii) of the Internal Revenue
Code." '' Essentially, the new definition of a "religious employer"
would eliminate
the first three requirements of the previous defi2
nition.
Along with the modification to the religious employer exemption, the February 2013 proposed rules created an accommodation for "eligible organizations" designed to accommodate nonprofits that fell outside the religious employer exemption but had
religious objections to the mandate. 0 3 Under the proposed rules,
an organization would qualify as an "eligible organization" for accommodation if:
(1) The organization opposes providing coverage for some or all of
any contraceptive services required to be covered under §147.
130(a)(1)(iv) on account of religious objections.
(2) The organization is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity.
(3) The organization holds itself out as a religious organization.
(4) The organization maintains in its records a self-certification,
made in the manner and form specified by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services... indicating that the organization satisfies
4
the [previous three] criteria.

This definition of an "eligible organization" would encompass
nonprofit religious educational institutions, charities, and other
religious organizations with religious objections to providing contraceptive coverage. 0 5 However, the proposed rules expressly
avoided accommodating for-profit organizations.'
By including a
broader range of religiously affiliated nonprofit organizations, the
proposed rules might alleviate some organizations' concerns
about the mandate; however, the accommodation likely does not
go far enough to reduce the burden on other religious groups.' °7

100.
101.
102.

See id. at 8461.
Id. at 8474 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a)).
Id. at 8461.

103.

Id. at 8457, 8458-59.

104. Id. at 8474-75. The self-certification process would be comparable to that under
the temporary enforcement safe harbor. Compare id. at 8462, with Bulletin, supranote 72,
at 3-5, 7.
105. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 8462.
106. Id.
107. See infra Section IV.B.1.a.
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The proposed rules do not accommodate for-profit organizations,
and, therefore, the proposed rules do not affect those organizations' challenges to the mandate.'0 8
After defining an "eligible organization," the proposed rules attempted to accommodate eligible organizations with both insured
plans and self-insured plans, while also ensuring plan beneficiaries' access to contraceptives without cost sharing. 9 For eligible
organizations with insurance coverage provided by third-party
health insurers, the proposed rules require the third-party insurer to "assume sole responsibility, independent of the eligible organization and its plan, for providing contraceptive coverage
without cost sharing ... to plan participants and beneficiaries."'' 1
The eligible organization would merely deliver a copy of its selfcertification to the health insurance issuer, and then the issuer
would be responsible for providing plan participants and beneficiaries with contraceptive coverage without cost sharing through
individual insurance policies."'
Moreover, the contraceptive coverage provided by the insurer
would not be offered by or through the group health plan, and the
issuer would be directed to ensure that the contraceptive services
were not reflected in the group health plan premium or any other
fee charged to the eligible organization." 2 According to the departments, the issuers would incur minimal costs from this added
contraceptive coverage burden because they would be insuring
the same set of individuals under the group plans and, accordingly, would reap the benefits associated with improvements in the
health of those women and fewer childbirths."3
The February 2013 proposed rules provided three less-thanclear proposals with regard to self-insured plans. Although the
mechanics of each proposal differ slightly, in essence, under each
proposal a qualified organization with a self-insured plan with a
third party administrator would transmit a copy of its self-

108. See Lyle Denniston, New Contraceptive Mandate Rules, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 1,
2013, 2:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/new-contraceptive-mandate-rules/.
109. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 8462-63.
110. Id. at 8462.
111. Id. at 8462-63. Student health insurance plans arranged by nonprofit religious
institutions of higher education that purchase insured coverage would be treated similarly. Id. at 8467.
112. Id. at 8462-63.
113. Id. at 8463.
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certification to the third party administrator, which would then
arrange to have a health insurance issuer provide contraceptive
coverage for plan participants and beneficiaries without cost
sharing. 14 The three proposals primarily differ concerning whether the third party administrator or individual health insurance
issuer would be responsible for providing the coverage."'
The February 2013 proposed rules did not include a specific
provision with regard to an accommodation for self-insured plans
without third party administrators."' During the ANPRM comment period, the departments received no comments concerning
those plans, and the government asserted that it believed very
few eligible organizations had self-insured plans without third
party administrators. 7
Finally, the proposed rules established a notice requirement for
the issuers of individual health insurance policies covering contraceptives for both insured plans and self-insured plans."' The
government would require the issuers to notify the plan participants and beneficiaries that the issuers provided contraceptive
coverage without cost sharing."'
Unlike the interim final rules promulgated by the departments,
the February 1, 2013 proposed rules are not binding until finalized. ' Moreover, the ultimate effect of the proposed rules remains uncertain because the departments elicited comments on
both the definition of an eligible organization and the substantive
provisions concerning the proposed accommodations for eligible
organizations. 2 ' The government altered the interim final rules to
include a religious employer exemption in response to comments
received by stakeholders. 2 ' Accordingly, it would not be unprecedented if the departments altered the proposed rules in response

114. See id. at 8463-64. Student health insurance plans arranged by nonprofit religious institutions of higher education that self-insure would be treated similarly. Id. at
8,467.
115. See id. at 8463-64.
116. Id.at 8464.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
121. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 8462-64.
122. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 3, 2011).
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to comments they receive during the proposal's sixty day notice
period. Moreover, the government's final rule must be responsive
to the comments made during the notice period.'23 Should the
government receive significant comments arguing that the eligible organization definition should be narrowed, the departments
might alter the final rule to accommodate fewer nonprofit organizations. While the administrative process continues to unfold,
plaintiffs' legal challenges to the mandate will likely continue because it is unclear whether the proposed rules will cure the mandate's alleged violation of rights under RFRA. Uncertainty over
the mandate will remain at least until the government finalizes
the proposed rules after the end of the comment period on April 9,
2013.124
The ACA's provisions authorized the government to promulgate the mandate and created the penalty provisions for noncompliance with the mandate. Those two factors create the alleged
burden on free exercise that plaintiffs claimed when they sued to
enjoin the government from enforcing the mandate under RFRA.
The mandate's amendment process, though possibly increasing
the number of nonprofit organizations exempt from the mandate
or accommodated, also prevented those organizations' RFRA
claims from succeeding in the courts in most cases.
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE MANDATE
Throughout the administrative process, various individuals
and organizations have opposed the mandate. Many of the more
than 200,000 comments to the interim final rule argued that the
religious employer exemption covered too few religious employers. 2' Religious organizations challenged the mandate even before
the government finalized it.' 26 For example, three months before
the mandate's promulgation, Belmont Abbey College, a Catholic

123.

See I RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 594 (5th ed.

2010).
124. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 8457.
125. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
126. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculusof Accommodation: Contraception,Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 1417, 1418-19 (2012).
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University, alleged that the mandate violated the First Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and RFRA. 2 7 Similarly,
one day before the departments finalized the mandate, the Eternal Word Television Network, a nonprofit organization operating
a television network with programming reflecting the teachings
of the Catholic Church, filed a complaint alleging similar violations.121
Opposition to the mandate from religious organizations only
increased after the government promulgated the final regulations
establishing the mandate. Given the number of legal actions
against the mandate that religiously-affiliated organizations filed
even before the government finalized it, the explosion of legal
challenges after the mandate's passage should not be surprising.
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops expressed its
opposition to the mandate contemporaneously with the government's decision to finalize it. 2 ' The conference argued that the
government should revoke the mandate in its entirety or, alternatively, expand the religious employer exemption to include a
broader range of religious objectors.' Religiously-affiliated organizations also expressed their opposition to the mandate by
submitting comments in response to the ANPRM. 3 Most importantly, the number of legal challenges to the mandate that
these organizations filed increased apace.'3 2

127. Belmont Abbey Coll. v. Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2012); see also,
e.g., Complaint at 3, Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 1l-cv-03350-CMA-BNB (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2011), available at http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/
CCU-v-Sebelius-Complaint-final.pdf.
128. See Complaint at 3, Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 2:12cv-00501-SLB (N.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2012), 2012 WL 401609.
129. See News Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Bishops Renew Call to
Legislative Action on Religious Liberty (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www.
usccb.org/news/2012/12-026.cfm.
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., Comments from Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., supra note 2, at 1-4.
132. See, e.g., Complaint at 1-3, E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 12-3009 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 9, 2012), 2012 WL 4803647; Complaint at 1-2, 4, Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, No.
2:12-cv-00207-JFC (W.D. Pa. May 31, 2012), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/
files/GenevaCollegeComplaint.pdf; Complaint at 4, Ave Maria Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 2:12CV-88-FtM-29SPC (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://www.becketfund.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/Complaint-Ave-Maria-Time-Stamped.pdf, Complaint at 1, La.
Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-00463 (W.D. La. Feb. 18, 2012), available at http://www.ad
fmedia.org/files/LouisianaCollegeComplaint.pdf.
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Although the number of cases contesting the mandate has increased, litigation remains in its infancy. A number of federal district courts have issued opinions and orders in mandate cases on
plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunctions and the government's motions to dismiss; however, only one court has ruled on
challenge by dismissing the case for failthe merits of a mandate
33
claim.
a
state
ure to
A. Courts Have Dismissed Almost All Nonprofit Cases on
ProceduralGrounds
Just as nonprofit organizations expressed disapproval for the
mandate during the administrative process, they were also
among the first plaintiffs to challenge the mandate in court. More
than any other group, the mandate arguably infringes upon the
religious exercise of religiously affiliated nonprofit organizations
other than churches.'3 4 For example, many schools, universities,
hospitals, and charities expressly hold religious beliefs opposed to
contraception, yet are not currently within the definition of a religious employer.'35 These organizations may not qualify under the
current definition because they serve a significant number of individuals who do not share those beliefs; they have a purpose other than the inculcation of religious values; they employ significant numbers of persons who do not share their religious beliefs;
or they are not organized as nonprofit entities within certain sections of the tax code.' 36 The government itself recognized the degree to which the mandate's definition of a religious employer in

133. See O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476 (CEJ),
2012 WL 4481208, at *15 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012) (granting the defendant's 12(b)(6) motion), stay pending appeal granted by O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.,
No: 12-3357, slip op. at 1 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is a judgment on the merits. See Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981) (citing Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 190 (1947); Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946)).
134. See infra Section IV.B.1.a.
135. See, e.g., Belmont Abbey Coll. v. Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29, 30 (D.D.C.
2012), appeal held in abeyance sub nom, Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 18, 2012) (per curiam).
136. See Coverage of Preventive Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(B) (2012). These organizations appear to be covered under the definition of an "eligible organization" in the Feb.
1, 2013 proposed rules, see Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable
Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8474-75 (Feb. 6, 2013); however, those organizations remain
non-exempt until the government promulgates a final rule accommodating them.
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sufficiently protects these organizations by issuing the temporary
enforcement safe harbor, announcing an intention to accommodate these organizations in the ANPRM, and proposing an accommodation for eligible organizations in the February 2013 proposed rules. 3 ' Though the February proposed rules purport to
accommodate these organizations, they likely do not satisfy
RFRA. 3
As the administrative process has unfolded, these nonprofit organizations have brought many of the lawsuits contesting the
mandate. Although a pattern has emerged in the district court
decisions on these motions, one important outlier exists.
1. District Court Decisions Dismissing Nonprofit Organizations'
Cases
In all of the nonprofit organization cases in which courts have
rendered decisions, the government moved to dismiss on the
ground that either the plaintiffs lacked standing or that that
their claims were unripe.'39 In each case, the government argued
the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not face an imminent injury as a result of the mandate's enforcement. " ° In the
government's view, the safe harbor provision prevents the departments from enforcing the mandate against the nonprofit

137. See Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg.
16,501, 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012); Bulletin, supra note 72, at 2-3.
138. See supra Section IV.B.I.a.
139. See Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Sebelius, No. 4:12-CV-00924-JAR, 2013 WL
328926, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 2013); Persico v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-123-SJM, 2013 WL
228200, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2013); Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 11-cv-03350CMA-BNB, 2013 WL 93188, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 7, 2013); Catholic Diocese of Peoria v.
Sebelius, No. 12-1276, 2013 WL 74240, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013); Univ. of Notre Dame
v. Sebelius, No. 3:12CV253RLM, 2012 WL 6756332, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012); Catholic Archdiocese of Biloxi, Inc. v. Sebelius, Civil No. 1:12CV158-HSO-RHW, 2012 WL
6831407, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 2012); Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius,
No. 12 Civ. 2542(BMC), 2012 WL 6042864, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012); Zubik v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00676, 2012 WL 5932977, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2012); Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, No, 3-12-0934, 2012 WL 5879796, at *2-4 (M.D. Tenn. Nov.
21, 2012); Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 887 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111 (D.D.C. 2012), appeal held
in abeyance 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 18, 2012) (per curiam); Belmont Abbey Coll. v.
Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25, 20 (D.D.C. 2012), appeal held in abeyance sub nor Wheaton
Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Nebraska ex. rel. Bruning v.
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 877 F. Supp. 2d 777, 804 (D. Neb. 2012); cf. Legatus
v. Sebelius, No. 12-12061, 2012 WL 5359630, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2012) ("[The court
is not persuaded that Legatus [a nonprofit organization] has standing to bring its claim.").
140. See, e.g., Catholic Diocese of Nashville, 2012 WL 5879796, at *3.
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plaintiffs. Therefore, the plaintiffs have not suffered a sufficiently
concrete injury upon which standing can be based."' Furthermore, the departments assert that their intention to amend the
regulations renders the plaintiffs' alleged injuries too speculative
an injury on which to grant standing because the amendment to
the regulations might relieve the plaintiffs from providing the
contested coverage.142
The government has also moved to dismiss the plaintiffs'
claims as unripe in each case. The government's ripeness argument, similar but not identical to its standing argument, is that
the courts should not rule on the validity of the mandate because
the government has committed itself to amending the mandate to
accommodate organizations like the plaintiffs.'4 3 Therefore, because the government's position expressed in the mandate is not
yet final, the court should find that the mandate is not sufficiently final for the plaintiffs' claims to be ripe.'
The nonprofit organizations have countered that they have suffered a sufficient injury to grant standing. They argue that even
though the government has chosen not to enforce the mandate
against them until after the safe harbor period elapses, they will
face enforcement of the mandate once that period ends.'45 These
organizations have also contended that the impending threat of
that enforcement is a sufficient injury.'4 6 Moreover, one plaintiff
argued that the mandate injured it by failing to afford sufficient
time to prepare to comply with whatever regulation the government ultimately enforces.' 47
In response to the government's arguments that their cases are
not ripe, the plaintiffs have contended that the government
promulgated the mandate in a final rule and that the ANPRM
does not alter the mandate's finality.'48 Accordingly, their claims
are ripe because the mandate is a final rule which will negatively

141. See, e.g., id.
142. See, e.g., Belmont Abbey Coll., 878 F. Supp. 2d at 34.
143. See, e.g., Zubik, 2012 WL 5932977, at *8-9.
144. See, e.g., id. at *1, 8-9.
145. See, e.g., Belmont Abbey Coll., 878 F. Supp. 2d at 35.
146. See, e.g., id.
147. See, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3:12CV253RLM, 2012 WL 6756332, at
*4 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012).
148. See, e.g., Nebraska ex. rel. Bruning v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 877 F.
Supp. 2d 777, 785 (D. Neb. 2012).
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impact them when the government enforces it after the safe harbor period lapses. 49

The majority of courts have sided with the government's arguments and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. Some courts reasoned
that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their alleged injuries
were too speculative."' These courts argued that there is too
much speculation because the government is not currently enforcing the mandate against the plaintiffs and because the government has promised to accommodate them before the safe harbor
period expires."' One court concluded that even though the temporary enforcement safe harbor did not alleviate the plaintiffs' alleged injuries, the ANPRM rendered those injuries too speculative for the purposes of standing."2 Other courts held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing because their plans were grandfathered
and, therefore, fell outside the scope of the mandate.' 3
Even if they had found a sufficient injury to grant standing,
these same courts would have granted the government's motions
to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims were unripe.
These courts held that, even if the plaintiffs had standing, their
claims were unripe because the government was in the process of
amending the regulations to accommodate the plaintiffs."' In the
149. But see id. at 801-02.
150. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
151. See Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Sebelius, No. 4:12 CV 00924 JAR, 2013 WL 328926,
at *7 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 2013); Univ. of Notre Dame, 2012 WL 6756332, at *4; Zubik v.
Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00676, 2012 WL 5932977, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2012); Catholic
Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, No. 3-12-0934, 2012 WL 5879796, at *3-4 (M.D. Tenn.
Nov. 21, 2012); Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 887 F. Supp. 2d 102, 107-10 (D.D.C. 2012), appeal held in abeyance 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam); cf. Legatus v. Sebelius,
No. 12-12061, 2012 WL 5359630, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2012) (footnote omitted) ("[The
court is not persuaded that Legatus [a nonprofit organization] has standing to bring its
claim."). The Zubik court did not need to discuss the issue of standing because it dismissed
the plaintiffs' case for lack of ripeness; however, the court discussed standing anyway. See
Zubik, 2012 WL 5932977, at *10.
152. Belmont Abbey Coll. v. Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36 (D.D.C. 2012), appeal held
in abeyance sub nom, Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
153. Zubik, 2012 WL 5932977, at *11; Nebraska ex. rel. Bruning, 877 F. Supp. 2d at
793.
154. See e.g., Catholic Archdiocese of Biloxi, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12CV158-HSORHW, 2012 WL 6831407, at *6-7 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 2012). One court stated that it need
not address ripeness arguments because of its decisions regarding standing, but then proceeded to discuss ripeness anyway. See Belmont Abbey Coll., 878 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
155. See Catholic Diocese of Peoria v. Sebelius, No. 12-1276, 2013 WL 74240, at *4-5
(C.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013); Univ. of Notre Dame, 2012 WL 6756332, at *3-4; Catholic Diocese
of Nashville, 2012 WL 5879796, at *4-5; Wheaton Coll., 887 F. Supp. 2d at 111-13; Ne-
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interest of judicial economy, these courts would dismiss the cases
to avoid ruling unnecessarily given the government's commitment
to altering the mandate to accommodate nonprofit organizations
with religious objections to the mandate.15 6
At the federal appellate level, only the D.C. Circuit has issued
an opinion on a nonprofit organization's challenge to the mandate. In Wheaton College, the court held that while the trial court
had improperly determined that the nonprofit religiouslyaffiliated college lacked standing, the college's claims were not
ripe because of the government's planned amendments to the
mandate."' The court emphasized that it based its decision on the
government's statement that it would never enforce the mandate
in its current form against the appellants or those similarly situated to them.15 Accordingly, the court held that the government's
statements were binding representations and ordered that the
cases be held in abeyance subject to status reports filed by the
government every sixty days. 9
Significantly, all of these courts dismissed nonprofit organizations' challenges to the mandate solely on proceduralgrounds and
did so without prejudice. Accordingly, these district court decisions seemingly in favor of the mandate do not presage how those
courts might rule should the government's promised changes to
the mandate fail to materialize. Unlike other court decisions on
motions for preliminary injunctions that necessarily consider a
plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits of its case, these decisions do not reflect how a court might rule on a future mandate
challenge once the government has followed through with its
promises. These decisions reflect more the uncertainty created by
the government's promise to alter the mandate and courts' general unwillingness to decide issues that might eventually become
moot than a view that the mandate satisfies RFRA's compelling
interest test. In short, the courts have dismissed nonprofit organ-

braska ex. rel. Bruning, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 800, 802.
156. See, e.g., Archdiocese of St. Louis, 2013 WL 328926, at *6, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Sebelius, Civil Action No. 12-0185 (ABJ), 2013 WL 285599, at *2-3
(D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2013); Persico v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-123-SJM, 2013 WL 228220, at *15
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2013); Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, Civil Action No. 11-cv-03350CMA-BNB, 2013 WL 93188, at *6-8 (D. Colo. Jan. 7, 2013); Catholic Diocese of Nashville,
2012 WL 5879796, at *5.
157. See Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 553.
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izations' challenges to the mandate, not because those RFRA
claims lack substantive merit-they do--but because the courts
cannot firmly analyze the substantive merit of those claims until
the government has finalized the promised changes to the mandate. In a similar case, one court's decision to deny the government's motion to dismiss, notwithstanding these other decisions,
might indicate the strength of these plaintiffs' substantive RFRA
claims.
2. The Outlier: Roman CatholicArchdiocese of New York v.
Sebelius
The court's decision in Roman Catholic Archdiocese signaled
the extent to which the mandate burdened employers' free exercise of religion because it allowed a nonprofit organization to
maintain a RFRA claim against the government, despite significant procedural issues. 6 ° While many of the courts considering
nonprofit organizations' actions to enjoin enforcement of the
mandate dismissed those cases on procedural grounds, the court
denied the government's motion in Roman Catholic Archdiocese
of New York v. Sebelius. 6' Like similar cases, the government
moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the plaintiffs
lacked standing and that the case was unripe for judicial review. '
The court first addressed the government's standing argument.
The court determined that two plaintiffs had failed to meet their
burden of establishing that the mandate applied to them because
their plans might have been grandfathered, and the court dismissed those plaintiffs' cases.' For the remaining plaintiffs, the
court then analyzed whether the temporary enforcement safe
harbor and ANPRM undermined the plaintiffs' standing,6 just
like
4
the other district courts which have considered the issue.

160. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius, No. 12 Civ. 2542 (BMC), 2012 WL
6042854, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. at *11-12; cf. Zubik v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-00676, 2012 WL 5932977, at
*11 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2012) (dismissing a plaintiffs case because the plaintiff had a
grandfathered plan); Nebraska ex. rel. Bruning v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
877 F. Supp. 2d 777, 792 (D. Neb. 2012) (same).
164. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y, 2012 WL 6042864, at *12-20.
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Unlike most other courts, Roman Catholic Archdiocese held the
temporary enforcement safe harbor did not reduce the certainty
that the plaintiffs would suffer an injury from the mandate, but
simply postponed when that injury would occur.'6 5 For that reason, the court agreed with the decision in Belmont Abbey that the
"temporary enforcement safe harbor d[id] not prevent [the] plaintiffs from establishing imminent injuries for standing purposes."'66 Given the concrete August 1, 2013 end date to the temporary enforcement safe harbor period,'6 7 and other court decisions
holding that a thirteen year gap before enforcement did not negate standing,'68 the court properly departed from other courts
that have addressed the standing question.
After recognizing that all the other courts in similar cases had
accepted the government's argument that the ANPRM rendered
the plaintiffs' injuries too speculative, the court rejected the reasoning of those decisions. 9 Although the court assumed that the
government had acted in good faith in publishing the ANPRM
and in stating that it would amend the mandate regulations, the
court concluded that the ANPRM alone was not enough to allow
the plaintiffs to avoid the enforcement of the mandate. 76 In the
court's view, the ANPRM amounted to only a request for input on
a potential change to the mandate and therefore did not prevent
the mandate from taking effect. 7 ' In short, the court held that the
plaintiffs had standing to sue based on their future injuries, despite the ANPRM. 72 In addition, regardless of the plaintiffs' asserted future injuries, the court further stated that present injuries to the plaintiff sufficiently afforded the plaintiffs with
standing.'7 3 The budgeting and administrative costs the plaintiffs
incurred in attempting to prepare for the mandate and the "diversion of funds away from ministries, such as healthcare, in or-

165. Id. at*13.
166. Id.
167. Bulletin, supra note 72, at 3.
168. See, e.g., Vill. of Bensenville v. FAA, 376 F.3d 1114, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
169. Roman CatholicArchdiocese of NY, 2012 WL 6042864, at *14-15 (citing conflicting decisions by the Zubik, Belmont Abbey College, Catholic Diocese of Nashville, Legat us,
and Wheaton College courts).
170. Id. at* 15.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at *16.
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der to prepare for possible fines for failure to comply with the
Coverage Mandate" were sufficient present harms.174 Based on
those future and present injuries, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs had standing,
and in so doing, set itself apart from the
175
other district courts.
The Roman Catholic Archdiocese court then disposed of the
government's motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs'
claims were unripe. As in the other mandate cases, the government argued that the plaintiffs' claims were not fit for judicial review because the ANPRM indicated that the government would
alter the mandate before it enforced the regulations against the
plaintiffs and because the temporary enforcement safe harbor
protected the plaintiffs from any hardship.' 76 Again, the court rejected the government's argument that the case was not fit for judicial review, underscoring that the mandate was a final rule, as
opposed to merely proposed rule. 77 Regarding the hardship prong
of the ripeness test, the court concluded that the mandate caused
hardship to the plaintiffs for the same reason that it created the
injuries upon which the plaintiffs had standing. 17 8 For those reasons the court held
that the plaintiffs had standing and that their
79
ripe.1
were
claims
In doing so, the Roman CatholicArchdiocese court was the first
court to rule against the government's procedural challenges to a
nonprofit organization's action to enjoin enforcement of the mandate. That decision placed it directly at odds with the courts that
had ruled to the contrary in almost identical cases. Whereas the
other courts were unwilling to find that the mandate harmed
nonprofit organizations against whom the government had not
yet enforced the mandate, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese court
recognized the harm that the mandate imposed on those organizations. ' The court renounced any desire to interfere with policy
174. Id. at *17.
175. Id. at *16.
176. See id. at*21.
177. Id. In the court's view, although the ANPRM had the potential to alter the mandate, it did not amount to a '"concrete' plan," and did not reduce the finality of the mandate because there was "no way to tell where [the ANPRM] will go." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
178. See Roman CatholicArchdiocese of N. Y, 2012 WL 6042864, at *22.
179. Id. at *23.
180. See supra notes 150-51, 178 and accompanying text.
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debates within the executive branch over the mandate, but found
that the risk of injury to the plaintiffs was too great to avoid adjudicating the matter while the government haltingly continued
the amendment-or,
more
accurately,
pre-amendmentprocess."' An assessment of the district court decisions in nonprofit cases remains speculative. However, even under the February 2013 proposed rules, many nonprofit organizations likely
have strong claims that the mandate violates RFRA. 8 2 The February 2013 proposed rules had no effect on for-profit corporations'
legal challenges. 83
B. Conflicting Trial Court Decisions in For-ProfitCases
Similar to the nonprofit organizations' challenges to the mandate, as of this writing none of the for-profit corporations' cases
have proceeded to trial. At this point in the litigation, courts have
concerned themselves primarily with for-profit plaintiffs' motions
for preliminary injunctions 8 4 and with the governments' motions
to dismiss. ' Unlike the decisions in the nonprofit organizations'

181. See id. at *22-23.
182. See infra Section IV.B.La.
183. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 8456, 8462 (Feb. 6, 2013).
184. See Annex Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-2804(DSD/SER), 2013 WL 101927, at *1
(D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2013); Triune Health Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
No. 1:12-cv-06756, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2013); Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., No. 2:12-CV-92-DDN, 2012 WL 6738489, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec.
31, 2012); Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2012 WL 6738476, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec.
30, 2012); Conestoga Wood Specialties, Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 5:12-cv-06744-MSG, slip op.
at 1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2012); Grote Indus. v. Sebelius, No. 4:12-cv-00134-SEB-DML, 2012
WL 6725905, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2012); Am. Pulverizer Co. v. Sebelius, Case No. 123459-CV-S-RED, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012); Korte v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., No. 3:12-CV-01072-MJR, 2012 WL 6553996, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2012),
injunction pending appeal granted by Korte v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 6757353, at *6 (7th Cir.
Dec. 28, 2012); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1283 (W.D.
Okla. 2012), motion for injunction pending appeal denied by No. 12-6294, 2012 WL
6930302, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012), and application for injunction pending appellate
review denied by Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 568 U.S. -,
, 133 S. Ct. 641,
643 (Sotomayor, Circuit Justice, 10th Cir. 2012); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-1635(RBW), 2012 WL 5817323, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2012); Legatus v. Sebelius, No. 12-12061, 2012 WL 5359630, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2012); Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1290, 1292 (D. Colo. 2012); cf. Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No.
12-2673, slip op. at 1, 3 (6th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (granting plaintiffs' motion for expedited
appeal and denying plaintiffs' motion for an injunction pending appeal after trial court's
denial of a preliminary injunction).
185. E.g., O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476-(CEJ),
2012 WL 4481208, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012), stay pending appeal grantedby No: 12-
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challenges to the mandate, which were almost uniformly decided,
the trial courts have been more evenly split in evaluating the motions by and against for-profit plaintiffs. In the limited number of
opportunities in which the courts of appeals have addressed these
challenges, they have also reached conflicting decisions.
As of this writing, in six cases, trial courts have preliminarily
enjoined enforcement of the mandate.'86 One court has also issued
a temporary restraining order enjoining the government from enforcing the mandate until the court has the opportunity to hear
arguments and consider the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction.187 Conversely, five other trial courts have denied plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction. 88 Finally, one court
adjudicated the merits of a for-profit organization's claims when
it dismissed those claims for failure to state a claim. 189

Trial courts that have preliminarily enjoined or temporarily restrained the government from enforcing the mandate have done
so for similar reasons. For a court to grant a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show (1) a likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) irreparable harm absent preliminary relief; (3) that
the balance of equities weighs in its favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. 9 ' In analyzing plaintiffs' RFRA
claims, these courts have found that the plaintiffs have met all of
these requirements.191 Most importantly, those decisions to preliminarily enjoin the government from enforcing the mandate

3357, slip op. at 1 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012).
186. Triune Health Grp. Inc., slip op. at 2; Monaghan, 2012 WL 6738476, at *1; Am.
Pulverizer Co., slip op. at 8-9; Tyndale House Publishers,Inc., 2012 WL 5817323, at *1;
Legatus, 2012 WL 5359630, at *1; Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1290.
187. See Sharpe Holdings, Inc., 2012 WL 6738489, at *6-7. Another court granted a
temporary restraining order, see Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., slip op. at 6, but has
subsequently denied a motion for a preliminary injunction. See 2013 WL 140110, at *18
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2013).
188. Conestoga Wood Specialties, Corp., 2013 WL 140110, at *18; Annex Med., Inc.,
2013 WL 101927, at *6; Grote Indus., 2012 WL 6725905, at *1; Korte, 2012 WL 6553996,
at *11-12; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1296-97.
189. O'Brien, 2012 WL 4481208, at *15.
129 S. Ct. 365, 374
190. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S ....
(2008) (citations omitted) (noting that plaintiff must show that "he is likely to succeed on
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.").
191. E.g., Sharpe Holdings, Inc., 2012 WL 6738489, at *4-5, *7; Am. Pulverizer Co.,
slip op. at 6-8; Tyndale House Publishers,Inc., 2012 WL 5817323, at *9-14.
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embody the trial court's conclusions that those plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their cases.
These courts have concluded that for-profit plaintiffs have
shown a likelihood of success on their RFRA claims.'92 Under
RFRA, a law is invalid if it imposes a substantial burden on a
person's exercise of religion and the government fails to prove
that it is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
government interest.9 3 The courts have, thus far, reasoned that
the mandate substantially burdens the plaintiffs' exercise of religion by forcing them either to provide contraception coverage or
pay penalties for refusing to do so.' Under the second prong of
RFRA test, courts have concluded that the plaintiffs were likely
to succeed on the merits of their case because the numerous exemptions to the mandate undermine the government's purportedly compelling interest.9 Only one court has addressed the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the third prong of the test because
the other courts concluded that a likelihood of success on the
compelling interest prong required the courts to grant the injunc"' However, the lone court addressing that question found
tions. 96
that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed because the government
would not be able to show that the mandate is the least restrictive means of achieving its interest.'9 7
These six decisions are significant because they embody trial
courts' conclusions that those plaintiffs are likely to succeed on
the merits of their cases. A decision to grant a preliminary injunction results not simply from an assessment that a plaintiff
will likely succeed on the merits, but from a complex balancing of
factors. 99 Nonetheless, courts have relied on plaintiffs' probability

192. RFRA will be discussed in depth in the following part. See infra Section W.A.
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(c) (2006).
194. E.g., Sharpe Holdings, Inc., 2012 WL 6738489, at *4-5; Am. Pulverizer Co., slip
op. at 6-7; Tyndale House Publishers,Inc., 2012 WL 5817323, at *11-14. One court simply
assumed that the mandate placed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs religion because
the plaintiff had stated that providing a health insurance plan covering contraceptives
would violate his beliefs and because the $2000 penalty for non-compliance would pressure
him to violate his beliefs. See Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12 15488, 2012 WL 6738476, at
*4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2012).
195. See, e.g., Am. Pulverizer Co., slip op. at 8; Tyndale House Publishers,Inc., 2012
WL 5817323, at *16-18; Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1297-98 (D. Colo.
2012).
196. See Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
197. See id. at 1298, 1299.
198. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 118-21
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of success on the merits of their RFRA claims in decisions to
grant preliminary injunctions.9 In the context of mandate litigation, in which only one court has ruled on the merits of a case,"' a
court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction demonstrates at
least some evidence of that court's view on the merits of a mandate challenge and the likelihood the court would grant a perma0 The cases granting preliminary innent injunction after trial."
junctions indicate that courts have been somewhat receptive to
arguments that the mandate violates RFRA and provide support
for the argument in Section IV that the mandate likely cannot
satisfy RFRA's compelling interest test.
To the same degree, five trial courts' decisions reaching opposite conclusions reflect that RFRA challenges to the mandate present unsettled legal questions. Four courts have denied motions
for a preliminary injunction, and one has dismissed a for-profit
plaintiffs case for failing to state a claim, either because the
courts found that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the
merits of their cases or because the plaintiffs were unable to show
a substantial burden on their exercise of religion.0 2 Though the
courts have expressed doubts that a for-profit corporation has
rights as a "person" under RFRA, only one court has reached that

(1991); supra note 190 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
201. See Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381, 383-84 (2005)
("[Tihe right to a preliminary injunction depends in large part (under all versions of the
controlling rule) on the probability that plaintiff will prevail if the case is litigated to a
conclusion."); see also LAYCOCK, supra note 198, at 120 ("What matters is the probability
that the preliminary relief to be granted will be a part of the relief to be awarded at final
judgment, or at least not inconsistent with the rights to be determined by the final judgment.").
202. Annex Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-2804 (DSD/SER), 2013 WL 101927, at *5 (D.
Minn. Jan. 8, 2013); Grote Indus. v. Sebelius, No. 4:12-cv-00134 SEB DML, 2012 WL
6725905, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2012), injunction pending appeal granted by No. 13
1077, 2013 WL 362725, at * 3-4 (7th Cir. Jan. 20, 2013); Korte v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Dec. 14,
Human Servs., No. 3:12-CV-01072-MJR, 2012 WL 6553996, at *10, *11 (S.D. Ill.
2012), injunction pending appeal granted by No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *5 (7th
Cir. Dec. 28, 2012); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1293-96
(W.D. Okla. 2012), motion for injunction pending appeal denied by No. 12-6294, 2012 WL
6930302, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012), and applicationfor injunction pending appellate
-, 133 S. Ct. 641,
review denied by Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 568 U.S. _,
642-43 (Sotomayor, Circuit Justice, 10th Cir. 2012); O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., No. 4:12-CV-476-(CEJ), 2012 WL 4481208, at *5-7 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28,
2012), stay pending appeal granted by No: 12-3357, slip op. at 1 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012).
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issue.20 3 These courts concluded that the mandate did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' exercise of religion because its
burden is indirect.2 4 In their view, the burdens on the plaintiffs
were too indirect because the corporations, not their owners, were
responsible for providing the contraceptive coverage and because
whether the plaintiffs would actually be required to fund the contraception depended on attenuated, independent decisions by employees. °5
C. ConflictingDecisions By the Courts of Appeals
Appellate courts have had only a limited opportunity to address challenges to the mandate; however, they have reached conflicting decisions in reviewing lower courts' decisions denying forprofit plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunctions.
The Seventh and the Eighth Circuits have granted injunctions
pending appeal in two cases in which the lower court refused to
preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the mandate.2 6 In Annex
Medical, the Eighth Circuit granted a for-profit plaintiff an injunction pending appeal, alleviating any doubt caused by
O'Brien.2 7 However, that decision minimally discussed the rationale behind granting that injunction.
The Seventh Circuit granted an injunction pending appeal
based on its conclusion that the Korte plaintiffs had shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their case.2"' The
court emphasized that the mandate likely burdened the for-profit
corporation's owners' religious exercise by forcing them to operate
203. Conestoga Wood Specialties, Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6744, 2013 WL 140110, at
*7, *10 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2003) (declining to "act as though this difference does not exist"
and holding that Conestoga cannot exercise religion); see Grote Indus., 2012 WL 6725905,
at *4 (expressing doubt whether a secular corporation has free exercise rights).
204. Grote Indus., 2012 WL 6725905, at *5; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d
at 1296; O'Brien, 2012 WL 4481208, at *6-*7.
205. Grote Indus., 2012 WL 6725905, at *4-5; Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 870 F. Supp.
2d at 1294; O'Brien, 2012 WL 4481208, at *6-7; see Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 151, 157-58 (2012); Frederick Mark Gedicks,
With Religious Liberty for All: A Defense of the Affordable Care Act's Contraception Coverage Mandate, AM. CONST. SOC'Y 9-11 (2012), http://ssrn.conabstract=216 3631.
206. Annex Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1118, slip op. at 5-6 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013);
Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *5 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012).
207. Annex Med., Inc., No. 13-1118, slip op. at 5-6.
208. Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *4-5; see also Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-2673,
slip op. at 3-4 (6th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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their company in a manner that violated their religious beliefs,
and accordingly granted the injunction." 9 In granting the injunction, the court recognized its decision, while consistent with the
Eighth Circuit, conflicted with the Tenth Circuit's decision in a
similar case. 1 ' Following the Seventh Circuit's decision in Korte,
at least one trial court has viewed that case as establishing binding precedent requiring a trial court to preliminarily enjoin the
government from enforcing the mandate when a for-profit plaintiff seeks such relief.2"' Likewise, in an indistinguishable for-profit
plaintiffs case, the Seventh Circuit has granted an injunction
'
pending appeal on the basis of its Korte decision. 12
As recognized by the Seventh Circuit in Korte, the Tenth Circuit reached a conflicting decision in the analogous Hobby Lobby
case. In Hobby Lobby, the Tenth Circuit relied upon the trial
court's reasoning to deny a motion for an injunction pending appeal." 3 However, the court provided little rationale for why it did
so. The trial court distinguished the case from other RFRA cases
where courts had granted injunctions to protect "a plaintiffs own
participation in (or abstention from) a specific practice required
(or condemned) by his religion" because the mandate did not require the plaintiffs direct participation in a practice condemned
by its religion.2 " The court asserted it would not likely "extend
the reach of RFRA to encompass the independent conduct of third
parties with whom the plaintiffs have only a commercial relation2 ' This decision mistakes
ship.""
the nature of the mandate's religious burden.1 6
Justice Sotomayor, as Circuit Justice for the Tenth Circuit, also
denied an application for an injunction pending appellate review
in Hobby Lobby. ' Justice Sotomayor reasoned that the appli-

209. Korte, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3-4.The court also found a likelihood of irreparable
harm to the plaintiffs and that the balance of harm tipped in their favor. Id. at *4-5.
210. Id. at *3-4.
211. See Triune Health Grp. Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:12-cv06756, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 3, 2013).
212. Grote v. Sebelius, No. 13-1077, 2013 WL 362725, at *3-4 (7th Cir. Jan. 30, 2013).
213. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302, at *3 (10th
Cir. Dec. 20, 2012).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See infra Section IV.B.I.a.
217. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 568 U.S ....
133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (So-
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cants had failed to make the showing-a higher showing than
that required for a preliminary injunction-that it was indisputably clear that they were entitled to relief given the absence of a
controlling decision by the Supreme Court and the conflict among
lower courts addressing similar actions.2 18 However, the opinion
emphasized that the plaintiffs could continue their challenge in
the lower courts and file a petition for certiorari following a final
judgment.219
Following both Hobby Lobby decisions, the Sixth Circuit also
denied a motion for an injunction pending appeal in Autocam."'
The Sixth Circuit first noted that neither the Supreme Court nor
any court of appeals had ever considered RFRA claims made by
for-profit corporations and that the district courts that had ad221
dressed mandate challenges had reached conflicting decisions.
The court then held that the plaintiffs had not shown more than a
mere possibility of relief-as required to obtain the requested relief-based on the opinion of the trial court and "the Supreme
222
Court's denial of an injunction pending appeal in Hobby Lobby.
Both the trial courts and courts of appeals have issued inconsistent opinions in the seemingly analogous cases brought by forprofit corporations alleging that the mandate violates their rights
under RFRA. The conflicting court decisions virtually ensure that
courts will continue to struggle with mandate cases and that appellate courts will deliver opinions in those cases. Conflicting decisions by the courts of appeals suggest that when those courts
ultimately consider the merits of a mandate challenge, they
might also reach opposite conclusions on whether the mandate
violates RFRA. If such a split in the circuits occurs, considering
the high profile of the mandate even outside the legal community and the individual nature of RFRA rights,2 24 the Supreme

tomayor, Circuit Justice, 10th Cir. 2012).
218. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 643.
219. Id.
220. Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-2673, slip op. at 2 (6th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See Aram A. Schvey, Much Ado About Nothing?: Religious Freedom and the Contraceptive-CoverageBenefit, 39 HUM. RTS. 11, 12-13 (2013); Ethan Bronner, A Flood of
Suits on the Coverage of Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2013, at Al; Denniston, supra
note 108.
224. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3, 107 Stat.
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Court will probably resolve the matter. As a corollary to some
courts' decisions to grant plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunctions, a substantial number of those courts have concluded
that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their cases. Such a decision might presage how those courts, and possibly
the Supreme Court, will rule when they finally reach the merits
of RFRA challenges. As the next section suggests, the mandate
does violate these plaintiffs' RFRA rights, as well as the rights of
nonprofit organizations that the government has not exempted
from the mandate.

IV. RFRA AND THE MANDATE
A. The Compelling Interest Test
Notwithstanding some trial court and appellate court decisions
suggesting the contrary, this section argues that the mandate violates RFRA.
Congress enacted RFRA in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Employment Division v. Smith.225 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment did not prohibit the government from burdening religious exercise through generally applicable laws.226 In doing so,
the Court expressly rejected the application of the compelling interest test it established in Sherbert v. Verner. Congress responded by enacting RFRA. 22 ' Through RFRA, Congress created a
statutory right to free exercise that would be more expansive
than the constitutional right to free exercise that the Court explicated in Smith because RFRA requires the government 229 to satis1488, 1489 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(c) (2006)) (permitting an individual

to bring suit alleging that governmental action has substantially burdened that individual's religious exercise).
225. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, § 2, 107 Stat. at 1488 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)-(b) (2006)).
226. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488.

227. Id. at 884-85.
228. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, § 2, 107 Stat. at 1488; 1 RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS § 5:29 (3d ed. 2012).
229.

Although RFRA does not apply to the states, it applies to the federal government.

Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 n.1 (2006).
Scholars have debated whether RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to federal legislation
as well. See, e.g., Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free
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fy the very Sherbert compelling interest test Smith rejected. °
That compelling interest test is more rigorous than the Smith
test. 231 The text of section 2 of RFRA expressly states that RFRA's
purpose is to restore the Sherbert test and to allow a person to
bring suit when the government has substantially burdened a
person's free exercise of religion. 232 The legislative history of
RFRA also demonstrates Congress's intention to create a statutory right to free exercise more extensive than free exercise rights
the government satisfy
under Smith by statutorily requiring
2 33 that
test.
interest
compelling
Sherbert's
The compelling interest test that RFRA adopted from Sherbert
and Yoder allows the government to substantially burden religious exercise only after satisfying a very exacting standard.
RFRA prevents the government from placing a substantial burden on a person's exercise of religion, even though that burden
might result from a rule of general applicability. 234 Nevertheless,
RFRA also creates a single exception. The government may sub-

Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 139-40 (1996); Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply
the Religious Freedom RestorationAct to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1967-69, 1977-78 (2001). But cf. Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 62 (1994) ("As applied to federal agencies, RFRA is simply an exercise of Congress'
undoubted power to control the activities of the federal government."). A further discussion of the constitutionality of RFRA is beyond the scope of this comment; however, given
the Court's decision in 0 Centro, supporters of the mandate might challenge the constitutionality of RFRA altogether if they cannot succeed in challenging RFRA's application to
the mandate.
230. Zackeree S. Kelin & Kimberly Younce Schooley, DramaticallyNarrowing RFRA's
Definition of "SubstantialBurden" in the Ninth Circuit-The Vestiges of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association in Navajo Nation et al. v. United States Forest Service et al., 55 S.D. L. REV. 426, 451 (2010); Arnold H. Loewy, Rejecting Both Smith
and RFRA, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 231, 235 (2011); Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty
after Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 470-72 (2010).
231. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(1)-(2) (requiring that the government's action be
the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest), with Smith, 494 U.S. at
879 ("[Ihe right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability .. ") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
232. Religious Freedom Restoration Act § 2, 107 Stat. at 1488 ("The purposes of this
Act are- (1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert ... and Wisconsin v. Yoder ... and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons [so burdened].").
233. See S. REP. No. 103-111, at 2 (1993); H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 1 (1993).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (2006).
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stantially burden a person's exercise of religion if the government's action (1) furthers a compelling government interest and
(2) is the least restrictive means of doing so.235 This compelling interest test is one of the most exacting standards a court will apply
to evaluate the validity of a law. and imposes an extraordinary
burden on the government to prove that the law satisfies this
strict standard.237 RFRA also includes a provision allowing persons to assert a claim in a judicial proceeding and to obtain relief
if the government's actions violate RFRA.2 5
Under RFRA's first prong, the government substantially burdens religion if it exerts substantial pressure on a person to violate his beliefs. RFRA does not define what constitutes a substantial burden. That said, the Supreme Court has addressed the
substantial burden prong of the compelling interest test in a
number of instances.
In Sherbert, the Court established that the government substantially burdens a person's religious exercise when it forces
that person to "choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting [government] benefits ... and abandoning one
2 9
of the precepts of her religion in order to accept [the benefits].""
The Court, in dicta, stated that imposing a fine on account of a
person's religious beliefs would also impose a substantial burden.24 ° Though that decision did not concern imposing a fine upon
someone on account of her religious beliefs, the Court implied
that such a fine would also impose a substantial burden. 4'

235. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2006).
236. RFRA's compelling interest test is considered equivalent to strict scrutiny. See,
e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 228, § 5:9. However, one court has indicated that RFRA's test is
more stringent than strict scrutiny because RFRA requires the government action be the
'least restrictive means" of achieving a compelling government interest, as opposed to
simply "narrowly tailored" to achieving such an interest. See United States v. Hardman,
297 F.3d 1116, 1129-30 (10th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) ("[The] least restrictive means is a severe form of the more commonly used narrowly tailored test.").
237. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-34 (1997); Marci A. Hamilton, The
Religious Freedom RestorationAct Is Unconstitutional,Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 13
(1998).
238. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c) (2006).
239. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
240. Id.
241. See id. The Court found that forcing the plaintiff to choose between receiving a
benefit and following her religion amounted to a burden on her religious exercise. In doing
so, it said that "such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of reli-
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The Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder further established that a law
that "compels [people], under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs" also substantially burdens religious exercise.242
Furthermore, government compulsion "may be indirect" and still
substantially infringe upon free exercise. 43
Collectively, these decisions indicate that the government substantially burdens a person's exercise of religion when it exerts
substantial pressure on that person to violate his beliefs.244 According to Professor Rodney Smolla, courts should apply a broad
definition of substantial burden because such an understanding
"is more faithful to the backdrop of judicial precedent against
which RFRA was enacted, and RFRA's legislative history. 45
Under the second prong, RFRA requires a court to determine
whether the government's imposition of the burden is in furtherance of a compelling interest."" Though the Court has yet to establish a conclusive definition of what constitutes a "compelling
interest," the Court's decisions provide some guidance in the context of religious exercise. According to Yoder, "only those interests
of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. 2 4 7 The government's interest must be "paramount," and not merely "colora2 ' Moreover, even if the
ble.""
law furthers to some degree an
"interest of the highest order," it does not further a compelling interest if "it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited. '' 4' Those cases establish that the government
gion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship." Id. The Court's
conclusion that denying a benefit was a burden based on its analogousness to imposing a
fine suggests that the imposition of a fine can likewise create a burden on free exercise.
242. See 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972).
243. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("While the
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.").
244. Id. at 717-18 ("Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.").
245. 1 SMOLLA, supranote 228, § 5:42 (footnote omitted).
246. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)(2) (2006). RFRA does not define what government interests are sufficiently compelling.
247. 406 U.S. at 215.
248. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
249. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547
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has the burden of proving that the mandate furthers an interest
that is "of the highest order" or "paramount"-not simply colorable-and that the mandate cannot "leave appreciable damage" to
that interest "unprohibited."'25 Under the Sherbert and Yoder
tests that RFRA adopted, most legitimate government interests
do not qualify as sufficiently compelling.25 '
Under RFRA's third prong, the government must show that it
has furthered its compelling interest through the means least restrictive on a person's religious exercise.252 In Sherbert, the Court
stated the government must demonstrate that no other alternative regulation existed which would serve the government's interest without infringing upon free exercise rights.252 .If courts literally applied the least restrictive means test, the government would
be very unlikely to prevail in any RFRA case because the government could almost always use a conceivably less restrictive
means to achieve its interests. 2 4 Recognizing this reality, some
courts do not require the government to refute every conceivable
alternative option to the government's chosen action; however, at
a minimum, they require the government to refute alternatives
presented by the party challenging the government's action.255
Therefore, courts will at least require the government to refute
the alternatives that the mandate's challengers provide.

(1993) (citations omitted).
250. See id.; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
251. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV.
221, 231 (1993); cf. Elizabeth C. Williamson, City of Boerne v. Flores and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: The Delicate Balance Between Religious Freedm and Historic
Preservation, 13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 107, 145 (1997) ("With RFRA in place, religious
entities and citizens can rest assured that only the most necessary interests will interfere
with their religious activities.").
252. The government bears the burden of proof as to whether the application of the
substantial burden to a person is the least restrictive means of furthering the government's interest. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, §
3(b)(2), 107 Stat. 1488, 1488-89 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b)) (requiring the
government to "demonstrate[] that application of the burden to the person ... is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest").
253. 374 U.S. at 407 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (stating that it is "incumbent
upon the [government] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights").
254. See Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRAk A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 195 (1995).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted).

2013]

THE HHS MANDATE

1343

If the mandate substantially burdens the free exercise of religion-which it does 25 6-RFRA's second and third elements place a
substantial hurdle in the path of the mandate by requiring the
government to show that the mandate is the least restrictive
means of furthering a compelling interest. Furthermore, Congress enacted RFRA while fully aware that it was creating a rigorous test for government actions burdening religion: RFRA contains express language that the Act's purpose was to restore the
more rigorous Sherbert and Yoder tests rejected by the Supreme
Court in Smith."7 Individuals have a legal right to challenge the
mandate as violating their statutory rights under RFRA when the
mandate substantially burdens their religious exercise.
B. The Mandate Will Fail to Satisfy RFRA's CompellingInterest
Test
The mandate cannot satisfy RFRA's compelling interest test
because it (1) places a substantial burden on the free exercise of
both nonprofit organizations and for-profit corporations; (2) does
not further a compelling interest because of its numerous exceptions; and (3) will not likely satisfy the least restrictive means
test.
1. The Mandate Substantially Burdens the Free Exercise Of
Both Nonprofit And For-Profit Corporations
The mandate imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise
of both nonprofit organizations and for-profit corporations under
RFRA's compelling interest test. The current form of the mandate
and the proposed rules substantially burden the free exercise of
those nonprofit organizations that maintain religious objections
to providing their employees with access to contraceptives coverage by forcing those organizations to violate their religious be-

256. See infra Section IV.B.1
257. See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text. Floor debates in the Senate also
suggest that senators were aware of the rigors of the compelling interest test. In the debates over whether to amend RFRA to exclude prisoners, one senator expressed his concern that the compelling interest test and its least restrictive means test would force prison officials to "set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of
accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint." 139 CONG. REC. S14463-64 (daily
ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson). After the senator's remarks, the
amendment was defeated, but the Senate voted 97-3 to pass RFRA. Id. at S14468, S14471.
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liefs.258 Likewise, the mandate burdens the free exercise of forprofit corporations that oppose providing access to contraceptives
for religious reasons. Though neither the Supreme Court nor the
courts of appeals have definitively resolved whether a for-profit
corporation can exercise religion under RFRA"' the courts should
apply RFRA's protections to for-profit corporations.
a. Nonprofit Organizations
The current version of the mandate places a substantial burden
on nonprofit organizations' exercise of religion by forcing them to
either act contrary to their sincerely held religious beliefs or incur
substantial fines. The mandate's substantive provisions burden
the employers' free exercise by requiring covered nonprofit organizations to provide their employees with an insurance plan that
guarantees that the employees will receive access to contraceptives at no cost to them. The mandate's penalty provisions make
that burden substantial.
As an initial matter, courts analyzing whether the mandate
burdens a nonprofit organization's religious beliefs must defer to
that organization's interpretations of its own beliefs. The Supreme Court has established that it is beyond the role of the
courts to determine the validity of a purported religious belief.26°
In essence, under RFRA, a court will defer to the plaintiffs assessment that the mandate requires conduct contrary to its religious beliefs.261 If an employer says that facilitating contraceptive
coverage alone violates the employer's religious beliefs, regardless
of whether an employee ever uses those contraceptives, the court
must accept the employer's version of its beliefs.262
The mandate burdens employers' free exercise by requiring
them to act contrary to their beliefs. Compliance with the mandate is anathema to countless non-exempt nonprofit organizations' religious beliefs that forbid them from facilitating access to

258. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2012 WL 6738476, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 30, 2012).
259. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 568 U.S .
133 S. Ct. 641, 642-43
(Sotomayor, Circuit Justice, 10th Cir. 2012).
260. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-57 (1982).
261. See, e.g., Monaghan, 2012 WL 6738476, at *4.
262. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 715 (1981).

2013]

THE HHS MANDATE

1345

contraceptives.2 6 The plaintiffs challenging the mandate believe
that the tenets of their religion forbid them from using contraceptives. 64 Furthermore, many of these nonprofit organizations not
only object to paying for contraceptive use, but also to facilitating
the mere access to contraceptives, regardless of whether an employee uses it. 265 Unfortunately for these organizations, the mandate requires them to provide an insurance plan that provides
employees with access to the contraceptives-the very conduct
their religious beliefs forbid.266 That requirement that the employer act contrary to its beliefs is a burden on the employers' free exercise.26 '
The amendments to the mandate the government proposed in
the February 2013 proposed rules likely will not lessen the burden on nonprofit organizations opposed to facilitating access to
contraceptives. Even though the only action required of an eligible organization would involve self-certification to an insurance
issuer or a third party administrator,2 68 that action might still require the eligible organization to violate its religious beliefs. The
proposed rules provide a degree of separation between the eligible
organization and contraceptive coverage because either the insurance company offering the coverage or the third party administrator is responsible for paying for the coverage. 26' However,
that degree of separation does not lessen the burden on "eligible
organizations."

263. See, e.g., EWTN Says New Mandate ProposalLikely Brings No Relief, CATHOLIC
NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/ewtn-says-newmandate-proposal-likely-brings-no-relief/.
264. E.g., Complaint at 6-7, Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sebelius, No.
2:12-cv-00501 (N.D. Ala. Feb 9, 2012), 2012 WL 401609.
265. See, e.g., Comments from Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., supra note 2, at 12; cf. Korte v.
Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012) (emphasizing that
the government misunderstood a for-profit plaintiffs claim because the "religious-liberty
violation at issue here inheres in the coercedcoverage of contraception, abortifacients, sterilization, and related services, not-or perhaps more precisely, not only-in the later purchase or use of contraception or related services").
266. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
267. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.
268. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 8456, 8474-75 (Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b)(4)).
269. See, e.g., Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, No. ll-cv-03350-CMA-BNB, 2013 WL
93188, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 7, 2013) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (nonprofit plaintiff
asserting that "deliberately providing insurance that would facilitate access to [contraceptives] ... would violate its deeply held religious beliefs, regardless of whether the insurance was paid for by [the plaintiff] or an insurer").
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The proposed rules might not alleviate the mandate's burden
on an eligible organization because that organization might view
itself as complicit in providing its employees with access to contraceptives. In other words, the organization might reason that
its choice to provide its employees with health insurance coverage
set into motion the process by which the Mandate requires third
parties to provide those employees with contraceptive coverage.2 7 0
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops made that argument in its comment to the ANPRM.27 1 To the extent a large
number of nonprofit organizations affiliated with the Catholic
Church have challenged the mandate, even if the government's
proposed rules accommodate a wider range of nonprofit organizations, they might not relieve the substantial burden on the religious exercise of other organizations. At least one nonprofit plaintiff, Eternal World Television Network, issued a preliminary
statement that it did not believe the proposed rule provided it
with any relief from the mandate.2 72 Although in most instances
dubious weight should be given to the statements of a litigant, in
the RFRA context a plaintiffs statements have added weight because courts defer to that plaintiff on whether an activity violates
its religious beliefs.7 Although, at this writing, the effect of the
proposed rules remains unclear, there is a strong possibility that
they will not alter the burden on many eligible organizations because the proposed rules have not altered the requirement that
those organizations provide insurance coverage that will ultimately result in an employee receiving access to contraceptives.
Supporters of the mandate have argued that the mandate does
not substantially burden these religious employers because it
does not force them to use or endorse contraceptives. 2 " They argue that the mandate does not burden a religious employer's free

270. The same thing might be said when employers pay taxes that are used to fund
contraceptives. See, e.g., O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 4:12 CV 476
(CEJ), 2012 WL 4481208, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 28, 2012). However, the difference in that
situation lies not in analysis under the burden prong, but under the other parts of the
compelling interest test; cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) ("Because the
payment of the taxes ... violates Amish religious beliefs, compulsory participation in the
social security system interferes with their free exercise rights.").
271. Comments from Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., supra note 2, at 12.
272. See EWTN Says New Mandate ProposalLikely Brings No Relief, supra note 263.
273. See Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2012 WL 6738476, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec.
30, 2012).
274. See Corbin, supra note 205, at 157-60; Gedicks, supra note 205, at 9-11; Schvey,
supra note 4, at 13.
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exercise because the employee's independent action determines
whether the employer has actually facilitated access to contraception.7 5
These critics fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the
burden on nonprofit organizations' religious beliefs. Unlike what
these critics suggest, no employee action is needed to burden
these employers' free exercise rights. The employer is required,
under the threat of substantial fines, to provide health insurance
for its employees.21 6 The mandate requires that health insurance
coverage includes contraceptives coverage without cost sharing.2 77
Even under the February 2013 proposed rules, that insurance
coverage will result in those employees receiving access to contraceptives.7 Therefore, the employer has violated its religious beliefs by establishing a health insurance plan through which, directly or indirectly, the employee will have the ability to obtain
contraceptives.2 79 To that extent, the decisions made by the employee are immaterial because the burden comes not just from facilitating the use of contraceptives, but also from facilitating access to contraceptives.
Mandate supporters have also contended that the mandate requires employers to "facilitate" access to contraceptives no more
than paying any compensation to an employee facilitates that
employee's access to contraceptives."' They argue that health insurance coverage is simply a form of compensation.2 " ' If the em-

275. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 205, at 157-59.
276. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
277. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 8456, 8474 (Feb. 6, 2013).
278. See id. Though employees might still need to schedule a doctor's appointment or
travel to a pharmacy before being able to acquire contraceptives under the employer's
plan, they will not be required to pay for those contraceptives out of pocket because the
mandate forbids imposing cost-sharing for required women's preventive services. The relevant consideration is, that short of actually distributing contraceptives itself the employer
has facilitated access to contraceptives to the greatest extent it can by providing an insurance plan that guarantees that employees will be able to acquire contraceptives without
cost-sharing once they have engaged in the minimum functional process necessary to
physically acquire those contraceptives.
279. See, e.g., Colo. Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 11-cv-03350-CMA-BNB, 2013 WL
93188, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 7, 2013); cf. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3-4, Korte v. U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-3841(7th Cir. Jan. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 431686
(for-profit plaintiff arguing that coerced coverage of contraceptive services burdened plaintiffs religious exercise).
280. See, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 205, at 10-11.
281. Id. at 11.
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ployer did not provide health insurance coverage, the employee's
wages or salary would be increased, and the employee could then
use that income to purchase contraceptives.2 82 From that perspective, the mandate "facilitate[s]" contraception no more than paying an employee a salary or wages because the employee can use
her wages to buy contraceptives. 3
These critics are mistaken. If an employee uses her wages to
purchase contraceptives, the employer has only indirectly facilitated access to contraceptives. The employee's choice to purchase
individual health insurance or to pay directly for the contraceptives creates that employee's access to contraception. The employee's choice has broken the causal link between the employer
and contraceptive access. The employer's decision to pay wages is
not a sufficient condition284 to the employee receiving access to
contraceptives because the employee must choose to use those
funds to acquire access to contraceptives. Conversely, if the employer chooses to provide health insurance coverage for employees-while the mandate requires that coverage to include contraception-the employer's choice to provide a plan alone has
8
Under the
facilitated the employee's access to contraceptivesY.
mandate, once the employer provides health insurance coverage,
it is certain that the employee will have access to contraceptives.8 That same degree of certainty is not present when an em-

282.

Id.
Id.
284. A sufficient condition of a stated proposition is a condition the occurrence of which
guarantees the occurrence of the stated proposition. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
283.

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 473 (2002) (defining a sufficient condition as "a proposition
having relation to the validity of another such that... validity of the first is sufficient evidence that the second is valid..."). For example, if X condition can by itself create Y outcome, X is a sufficient condition of Y.
285. See Michael Gerson, Editorial, A Solution that Fixes Nothing, WASH. POST, Feb. 5,
2013, at A15 ("While these institutions aren't required to pay directly for contraceptive
coverage, they are forced to provide insurance that includes such coverage. It is a shell
game useful only for those who want to deceive themselves.").
286. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. 8456, 8474 (Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)). Though
other barriers to physically acquiring contraceptives would exist such as a doctor's unwillingness to prescribe medication or an inability to travel to a pharmacy to fill a prescription
for contraceptive medication, the employer has eliminated the crucial barrier of costsharing by the employee, The other barriers to accessing contraceptives would be present
under any variation to the mandate short of requiring the employer to offer an onpremises one-stop shop for contraceptives where an employee could consult a doctor, receive a prescription for contraceptives, and have that prescription filled.
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ployer simply provides an employee with wages that might eventually aid the employee in receiving access to contraception.
In sum, notwithstanding the arguments of mandate proponents, both the mandate and the February 2013 proposed rules
place a burden on the religious exercise of non-exempt nonprofit
organizations by requiring them to facilitate access to contraceptives that violate their religious beliefs. This burden is substantial because of the steep fines the government will exact for noncompliance.
The mandate's penalty provisions compel nonprofit organizations to comply with the mandate or face a fine.287 Although the
government's proposed rules have taken a preliminary step towards accommodating more nonprofit organizations with religious objections to the mandate,"' the current version of the
mandate does not accommodate many nonprofit organizations
with religiously based objections to the mandate.8 9 If these nonexempt nonprofit organizations refuse to provide contraceptive
coverage to their employees, the government will assess a $2000
annual fine against them for each of their full-time employees
and a $100 per day per worker tax on them as well.29 °
The mandate's fine transforms its burden on free exercise into
a substantial burden. The mandate's fine is the sort of coercive
burden that Congress designed RFRA to eliminate. Congress enacted RFRA in order to restore the compelling interest test set
out in Sherbert and Yoder. 291 As the Court emphasized in Thomas,
the dispositive question is whether the state has placed substantial pressure on the religious adherent to violate his religious beliefs.292 Importantly, the directness of the government's pressure
does not control whether a burden is substantial. The Court in

287. 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(a)-(b) (Supp. V 2011).
288. See supra Section II.B.
289. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(iv)(B) (2012). To qualify for the exception, an employer
must satisfy four conditions: (1) Have the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2)
primarily employ persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serve persons who
share its religious tenets; and (4) be a nonprofit organization under section 6033(a)(1) and
section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code. Id.
290. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
291. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b), 107
Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (2006)).
292. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
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Sherbert recognized an indirect burden can be as impermissible
as a direct burden.292
The mandate's fine creates a substantial burden by putting
substantial pressure on non-exempt nonprofit organizations to violate their religious beliefs. Forcing an organization to choose between paying a fine and following its religious tenets is akin to
the burden of choosing between one's religious beliefs and receiving a benefit, the unconstitutional burden upon the plaintiff in
Sherbert.29 The mandate does not carry criminal sanctions, like
the compulsory school attendance law in Yoder. 29' Nonetheless, by
requiring nonprofit organizations to provide health insurance
coverage for contraceptives anathema to their religious beliefs,
the mandate's penalties for noncompliance pressure nonprofit organizations like Catholic Health Services of Long Island to "perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs" in order to avoid the mandate's penalties.296
Accordingly, the mandate's burden on those organizations' free
exercise is substantial.
If the mandate remains unchanged, it will substantially burden
the religious exercise of non-exempt nonprofit organizations.
Even under the February 2013 proposed rules, that substantial
burden will likely remain on many nonprofit organizations. It will
certainly continue to burden for-profit corporations.
b. For-Profit Corporations
The mandate also substantially burdens the religious exercise
rights of for-profit corporations and those corporations' owners.
The mandate indisputably applies to for-profit corporations under
the current regulations29 7 and February 2013 Proposed Rules. 298

293. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 833
599, 607 (1961)).
294. See id.
295. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972).
296. Id. at 218; see Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius, No. 12 Civ. 2542
(BMC), 2012 WL 6042864, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012); see also Thomas C. Berg, Religious Structures under the Federal Constitution, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 129, 134-35 (James A. Serritella et al. eds., 2006) ("The special solicitude
for religious freedom was clearest in situations where a believer or church was forced by
government to violate a specific doctrinal tenet-for example, in Sherbert v. Verner .... ").
297. See Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(iv)(B)(4)
(2012); Bulletin, supra note 72, at 3.
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Therefore, an analysis of for-profit corporations' RFRA claims is,
in one sense, more straightforward because it need not consider
the February 2013 Proposed Rules' effects. On the other hand,
that analysis is more difficult because the Supreme Court has not
considered whether a for-profit corporation can exercise religion
under RFRA or the First Amendment.29 9 The similarity between
for-profit corporations and nonprofit organizations suggests that
they can: both are entities separate from their members or owners, both incorporate for similar reasons, and both can facilitate
the religious exercise of their members or owners.3 0 '
The for-profit corporations' RFRA claims enter a somewhat uncharted area of law. The courts hearing for-profit corporations'
challenges to the mandate have recognized that those cases present difficult questions about whether a for-profit corporation can
exercise religion.301' Neither the Supreme Court nor the courts of
appeals have conclusively determined whether a for-profit corporation can exercise religion.3 2
Unsurprisingly, courts have reached divergent conclusions on
this controversial issue. The Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood
Specialties courts have expressly held that for-profit corporations
cannot bring a claim under RFRA"' The Hobby Lobby court reasoned that RFRA's context suggested that a for-profit corporation
was not a "person" whose religious exercise could be substantially

298. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78
Fed. Reg. at 8474 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)).
299. Exercise of religion under RFRA is coextensive with exercise of religion under the
First Amendment. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 5,
107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (2006)).
300. See infra notes 323-45 and accompanying text.
301. See, e.g., Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (D. Colo. 2012) ("These
arguments pose difficult questions of first impression. Can a corporation exercise religion?
Should a closely held subchapter-s corporation owned and operated by a small group of
individuals professing adherence to uniform religious beliefs be treated differently than a
publically held corporation owned and operated by a group of stakeholders with diverse
religious beliefs? Is it possible to 'pierce the veil' and disregard the corporate form in this
context?").
302. See Legatus v. Sebelius, No. 12-12061, 2012 WL 5359630, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct.
21, 2012) (stating that "[n]either the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit has held that a
for-profit corporation can assert its own rights under the Free Exercise Clause").
303. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6744, 2013 WL 140110,
at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2013); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278,
1291-92 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (footnote omitted) ('The same reasons behind the court's conclusion that secular, for-profit corporations do not have First Amendment rights under the
Free Exercise Clause support a determination that they are not 'persons' for purposes of
the RFRA.").
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°4 The Conestoga Wood Specialties court emphasized
burdened.3
that although the Supreme Court has extended certain constitutional rights to corporations, those decisions turned upon the history, nature, and purpose of the constitutional provision in question..3 " The court then held that "the nature, history and purpose
of the Free Exercise Clause demonstrate that it is one of the
'purely personal' rights ...unavailable to a secular, for-profit
corporation." ' 6 Other courts resolving for-profit corporations'
challenges to the mandate have refused to address whether a forprofit corporation can exercise religion.0 7 Still others, including
the Seventh Circuit, have implicitly suggested that a corporation
can exercise religion.0 8

Trial and appellate court decisions to preliminarily enjoin the
government from enforcing the mandate against for-profit corporations suggest that there is at least a possibility that those corporations can exercise religion for the purposes of RFRA. Before
granting a preliminary injunction, a court must find that the
plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of its case.00 A number
of trial and appellate courts have granted preliminary injunctions
to for-profit corporations.' 10 To the extent a court concludes that a
plaintiff is likely to succeed on an RFRA claim, the court has implicitly determined that the plaintiff can exercise religion because
a RFRA claim requires a substantial burden on religious exercise.
Therefore, the trial court decisions to grant preliminary injunctive relief to for-profit corporations support a conclusion that forprofit corporations can exercise religion.

304. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1291-92.
305. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 2013 WL 140110, at *6 (citing First Nat'l Bank
of Bos. v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978)).
306. Id. at *7.
307. See, e.g., Grote Indus. v. Sebelius, No. 4:12-cv-00134-SEB-DML, 2012 WL
6725905, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2012) ("[W]e decline to reach the issue of whether a
secular, for-profit corporation is capable of exercising a religion within the meaning of

RFRA.").
308.
2012).
309.
310.

See Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3-4 (7th Cir. Dec. 28,
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
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An entity's corporate status alone does not resolve the question
of whether the entity can exercise religion. " Indeed, an entire
line of Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence relates to
resolving the internal disputes within religious organizations.312
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that government activity can unconstitutionally violate the free exercise clause by suppressing the religious exercise of a nonprofit corporation.313 In a
related context, Justice Alito has emphasized that religious bodies serve a crucial function in protecting individuals from the
power of the state.3 " In short, not only has the Court held that a
nonprofit corporation can exercise religion, it has also recognized
that those corporations serve an important role in protecting the
individual from the state.
In another First Amendment area-free speech-the Supreme
Court has extended constitutional protections to for-profit corporations. In Citizens United, the Supreme Court expressly held
that a corporation could exercise a First Amendment right
through political speech.31 The Court underscored that "[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political
' Political speech
speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations."3 16
and religious exercise are not identical. A for-profit organization
might have a stronger interest in political speech than religious
exercise to the extent that a for-profit corporation might directly
benefit from one politician's policies more than another's.

311. See Grote Indus., 2012 WL 6725905, at * 3-4 (7th Cir. Jan. 20, 2013); Korte v. U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., No. 12-3841, slip. op. at 4 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012)
("That the Kortes operate their business in the corporate form is not dispositive of their
claim.").
312. See Berg, supra note 296, at 145-46.
313. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525,

").The Lukumi Court's
547 (1993) ("Petitioner... is a not-for-profit corporation ....
statement that "the Church and its congregants practice the Santeria religion" supports
the notion that a church as a separate entity can exercise religion. Id. at 525 (emphasis
added).
314. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.....
132 S. Ct. 694, 712 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 619 (1984)); see also William P. Marshall, Constitutional Coherence and the Legal
Structures of American Churches, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 296, at 759, 770 ("Religious institutions form intermediary institutions that
shield the individual from the government.").
130 S. Ct. 876, 913
315. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S ....

(2010).
316.

Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
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That said, if an organization can hold political beliefs-a proposition the Supreme Court recognized in Citizens United3 '--there
is a strong argument that a corporation can hold religious beliefs.
To the extent "shareholders may decide, through the procedures
of corporate democracy, whether their corporation should engage
in debate on public issues,"3 '8 those same shareholders may decide
that the corporation should engage in religiously motivated behavior or operate in accordance with religious principles. Similarly, religious beliefs, like political beliefs, compete with other religious and secular beliefs in public discourse.319 To the extent
religious values and beliefs form the framework of some individuals' political beliefs, it might be difficult to disentangle religious
exercise from political speech.32 ° That difficulty suggests that forprofit political speech might at times be indistinguishable from
possible for-profit religious exercise. While the history, purpose,
and nature of free exercise rights are different from the history,
purpose, and nature of political free speech rights,321 that conclusion alone does not necessarily indicate that a court should find
that a for-profit corporation cannot exercise religion. The case for
corporate political speech may be stronger than the case for corporate free exercise, given the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United; however, the Supreme Court has not conclusively resolved whether a for-profit corporation can exercise religion.322
The similarity between nonprofit organizations and for-profit
corporations suggests that courts should resolve the question in
317. See id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 912-13.
318. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978).
319. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) ("In the realm of religious
faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one
man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of
view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who
have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion
and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy."); Marshall, supra note 314,
at 761.
320. Cf. Marshall, supra note 314, at 767 ("Religion often gets directly involved in the
public debate over issues of national importance.... Religious values and beliefs compose
an important part of the social fabric that underlies political choice .... Religious beliefs,
like political beliefs.., are in competition with each other and with secular belief systems
for the hearts and minds of adherents.").
321. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6744, 2013 WL 140110,
at *6-8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2013).
322. See id. at *6-7.
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favor of for-profit corporations because those entities are comparable to nonprofit corporations. If a nonprofit corporation can exercise religion (a widely accepted proposition),2 a for-profit corporation should be able to as well because (1) both are separate
entities from their members; (2) both incorporate for similar reasons; and (3) both can facilitate the religious exercise of human
persons.
First, both nonprofit corporations and for-profit corporations
are distinct legal entities from their members or owners. When an
incorporator files articles of incorporation for a nonprofit corporation, the incorporator creates a separate and distinct legal entity.3 2' That legal entity, a nonprofit corporation, is separate from
its members."' As a separate legal entity, the nonprofit corporation has the authority to take a wide range of actions on its own
behalf, including suing and being sued, holding property, and
making contracts.326 Similarly, a for-profit corporation is an entity
that is distinct from its shareholders. 2 7 The for-profit corporation,
just like the nonprofit corporation, can take a wide range of actions on its own behalf, including suing and being sued, holding
property, and making contracts.328 In short, both nonprofit and
for-profit organizations are similar in legal form as entities separate from their members or shareholders. Accordingly, if free exercise depends on the activity of individuals, for-profit and nonprofit corporations, as distinct entities from their members or
owners, are similarly situated vis-,A-vis human persons.
As distinct legal entities, nonprofit and for-profit corporations
alike shield their members or owners from the corporations' liabilities and should be treated the same on that basis. Once a forprofit or nonprofit corporation is formed, any liabilities it incurs
through the exercise of its powers are the liability of the corpora-

323. See supranotes 260, 263-66 and accompanying text.
324. See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2.03 (2008). State law governs nonprofit corporations; however, the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act is useful for illustrative purposes.
325. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 25 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2006).
326. See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2008).
327. 1 FLETCHER, supra note 325, § 25 (Supp. 2012).
328. Compare MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2008), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 3.02 (2011).
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321

tion, but not its members or owners. 2 One court has concluded
that because the corporate form shielded a for-profit owner from
liability, the owner could not exercise religion through the corporation. 3' However, to the extent the corporate form likewise

shields the members of nonprofit corporations from liability, that
principle also would seem to extend to nonprofit corporations as
well. The Supreme Court has protected a nonprofit corporation's
exercise of religion and did not mention the relevance of a corporate shield.331 Thus, courts should not distinguish between for-

profit corporations and nonprofit corporations on the basis of either type of entity's corporate shield.
Second, individuals form nonprofit corporations and for-profit
corporations for similar reasons. For example, one prominent
scholar on the law of corporations has emphasized that individuals form for-profit corporations to allow for an entity to exist perpetually independent of the individuals that compose it and to
limit owners' liability.332 Individuals form nonprofit corporations
for similar reasons. For example, members of an unincorporated
religious association can be personally liable for the debts of the
association and cannot hold property as an association.3 By incorporating into a nonprofit corporation, a religious organization
can solve these problems and receive similar benefits as a forprofit corporation. The nonprofit corporation benefits from clear
corporate structure allowing for continuity through perpetual
succession; the corporation limits church members' liability; and
the corporation can own property in its own name. 3 4 The similar

motivations behind using the corporate form for both nonprofit
and for-profit entities undermine the contention that one entity
has free exercise rights, but the other does not.

329. See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.12 (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22
(2011).
330. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6744, 2013 WL 140110,
at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2013).
331. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
332. See 1 FLETCHER, supra note 325, §§ 7, 25.
333. 2 MARILYN E. PHELAN, PHELAN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 16:10, 16:11 (2010).
334. Id. § 16:13; see JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A- NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 243-44 (3d ed. 2011).
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Admittedly, for-profit corporations and nonprofit corporations
are not identical, but the important question is how they differ in
relation to free exercise. Nonprofit corporations receive a host of
benefits that for-profit corporations do not receive, including tax
exemptions, access to certain categories of government contracts
and funding, a friendly regulatory environment, and the reputational benefits associated with nonprofit organizations.33 5 However, it is not eminently clear why these benefits accrue in favor of
increased free exercise rights for nonprofit corporations under the
mandate but not for for-profit corporations. Although a nonprofit
corporation can legally be formed for the specific purpose of furthering a religion,336 the February 2013 proposed rules do not require a nonprofit corporation's charter to include such a provision
in order for a nonprofit organization to qualify as an eligible organization."' Accordingly, a nonprofit corporation's charitable
purpose provision provides only a small distinction between forprofit corporations and nonprofit corporations because the mandate does not require nonprofit corporations to be incorporated for
a religious purpose.
The profit motive does not sufficiently distinguish a for-profit
corporation from a nonprofit corporation for RFRA purposes either. The greatest seeming distinction between for-profit and
nonprofit corporations is the former's profit motive. However, incorporation as a nonprofit corporation does not mean that corporation cannot make a profit. Many nonprofit corporations make
substantial profits. 33 Nonprofit status simply forbids the corpora-

335. See NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE
MODERN NONPROFIT SECTOR 15-17 (2001).
336. See Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, in
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 296, at 223, 226-27.
337. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(iv)(B) (2012) (only exempting an employer that (1) has
the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employs persons who share
its religious tenets; (3) primarily serve persons who share its religious tenets; and (4) is a
nonprofit organization under section 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the
Internal Revenue Code); Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable
Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 8456, 8474-75 (Feb. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §
147.131(b)).
338. 1 PHELAN, supra note 333, § 1:1. For example, the National Collegiate Athletic
Association is a nonprofit corporation. National Collegiate Athletic Association and Subsidiaries: Consolidated Financial Statements As of and for the Years Ended August 31,
2011 and 2010, NAT'L COLL. ATHLETIC ASSOC. 6 (2011), available at http://www.ncaa.
org/wps/wcm/connectlpublic/NCAA/FinancesfNCAA+consolidated+financial+statements.
In 2011, the NCAA had a total revenue in excess of $845 million and total expenses of
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tion from making profit distributions to members. 9 The nonprofit
organization's members can still receive reasonable compensation
for their efforts and reimbursement for reasonable expenses they
incur.34 ° Though these members may have a lesser incentive to
earn profits than their for-profit counterparts, the law does not
forbid nonprofit corporations from doing so. Nonprofit corporations' ability to earn profits indicates that profit-making, when
combined with the long-accepted view-almost taken as a given
in some instance-that they can exercise religion,3 4' indicates that
nonprofit corporations are not so different from for-profit corporations that the latter should be denied relief when government policies force those corporations to take actions contrary to their beliefs. Actions, which if taken by a nonprofit corporation, would
entitle that corporation to relief.
Third, for-profit corporations can facilitate and protect the free
exercise of individuals in a similar fashion to nonprofit corporations. The free exercise of religion often involves doing so along
with other individuals.342 For many individuals this associational

roughly $778 million, generating a profit of roughly $67 million. See id. at 4. Scholars have
recognized that nonprofit corporations often compete in the same markets as for-profit
corporations. See 1 PHELAN, supra note 333, § 1:1. Indeed, there is almost no doubt the
NCAA's Division I Basketball Tournament crowds out some professional basketball viewership during that period. Though the NCAA surely will not qualify as an "eligible association," see Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 8462, the important point is that the NCAA's corporateform alone would not prevent it from qualifying for the accommodation. Nor would the fact that it competes with
for-profit organizations. See id. The competition between nonprofit corporations, already
aided by substantial preferences over for-profit organizations such as tax exemption,
SILBER, supra note 336, at 15-17, and for-profit corporations indicates that the fears that
allowing for-profit corporations to receive RFRA relief would tip the competitive scales decisively in favor of those for-profit corporations, see Gedicks, supra note 205, at 18, do not
resolve the issue of whether a corporation, for-profit or nonprofit, can exercise religion. If
nonprofit corporations' added competitive advantage through exemption from the mandate
does not lessen those corporations' ability to exercise religion, that added competitive advantage to for-profit corporations should not determine whether a for-profit corporation
can exercise religion.
339. See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 6.40 (2008).
340. Id. § 6.41.
341. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525
(1993) (stating that "Petitioner... is a not-for-profit corporation.... The Church and its
congregants practice the Santeria religion."). The Lukumi court seemed to assume that the
nonprofit corporation plaintiff could exercise religion, and did not discuss the corporate
status of that church beyond the factual background information of the case.
342. See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Full and Free Exercise of Religion, in
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 296, at 773, 804.
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freedom is a crucial aspect of their faith. 43 The Supreme Court
has recognized that individuals often exercise religion through
nonprofit corporations. 3" Likewise, a for-profit corporation might
facilitate an individual's or group's exercise of religion. 45
The plaintiffs in Tyndale House Publishers and Newland
demonstrate how a for-profit corporation might facilitate an individual's or group's exercise of religion. 346 In Tyndale House Publishers, a for-profit corporation engaged in significant religious
activities itself and facilitated the free exercise of the corporations' employees. 347 The Tyndale House Publishers' articles of incorporation declared that its corporate purpose was to "minister
to the spiritual needs of people, primarily thorough literature
consistent with biblical principles. 343 To that end, the corporation
primarily produced Christian books including biblical commentaries and Christian fiction.3 9 The vast majority of the profits
from those sales accrued to the corporation's primary owner, a
nonprofit religious entity that directed much of its proceeds to
Christian ministries. 35" The production, sale, and distribution of
religiously-themed literature, in furtherance of the corporation's
express purpose, might be viewed as the corporation exercising
religion by spreading the religious beliefs adopted in its articles of
incorporation, similar to an individual spreading his own personal beliefs.

343. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1373, 1389 (1981).
344. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 525, 528 (religious
nonprofit organization bringing First Amendment free exercise claim).
345. And possibly its own exercise. Though it is analytically difficult to imagine how
corporations (entities sometimes described as 'legal fictions") can exercise any religion of
their own, this same difficulty applies equally between nonprofit and for-profit corporations. See supra notes 297-302 and accompanying text. If a nonprofit corporation can exercise its own religion independent of its members, the corporate form alone of the forprofit corporation does not exclude it from doing so.
346. Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-1635(RBW), 2012 WL 5817323,
at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2012); Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (D. Colo.
2012).
347. Tyndale House Publishers,Inc., 2012 WL 5817323, at *2, *7.
348. See id. at *7 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
349. See id. at *2.
350. See id.
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Additionally, Tyndale House Publishers facilitated its employees' exercise of religion in much the same way a nonprofit religious corporation might by providing a location where those employees could worship. By holding weekly chapel services for its
employees, Tyndale House Publishers created a forum in which
its employees could exercise their faith.35' Just as a church might
facilitate the free exercise of individuals by allowing them a place
for communal worship and sharing of their beliefs,"' Tyndale
House Publishers allowed its employees to53 come together in order
to worship, a distinctly religious activity.
Korte illustrates how a corporation might facilitate the free exercise of its owners. 354 In Korte, a closely-held, family-run, forprofit corporation and its owners sued to enjoin the government
from enforcing the mandate. 355 The corporation's owners sought to
operate their corporation in accord with their Catholic beliefs and
356
objected to the mandate's contraceptives coverage provisions.
The corporation in Korte provided its owners with a forum
through which they could practice and express their religious beliefs.357 Likewise, one can imagine evangelical owners forming a
for-profit corporation to facilitate their practice of religion by operating as an example of Christian principles that might bring
individuals into their religious fold.355 In short, just as a nonprofit
organization might allow members to express their religious beliefs by operating an organization in accord with their faith, a forprofit corporation might provide a similar conduit for its owners.
The similarity between nonprofit corporations and for-profit
corporations indicates that for-profit corporations should have

351. Id. at *7.
352. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 52526 (1993).
353. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("[Tihe exercise of religion often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical act: assembling with others for a worship service....").
354. Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012).
355. See id. at *3.
356. Id. at *1.
357. Id. at *1, *3, *4.
358. Cf. BRUCE T. MURRAY, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 32 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("For evangelicals, the example Christians set in their daily lives, the
help they give the needy, and the effectiveness of their proclamation of the gospel-these
can bring lost souls to Christ and help fulfill the divine plan.").
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free-exercise rights coextensive with those of nonprofit corporations. If the corporate form does not preclude a nonprofit corporation from exercising religion, it should not preclude for-profit corporations from doing so. Accordingly, to satisfy the rigorous test
established by RFRA, the mandate must further a compelling
government interest and must be the least restrictive means of
doing so."' Ultimately, its myriad exemptions probably cause it to
fail the second prong of RFRA test.
2. The Mandate's Exemptions Undermine the Government's
Compelling Interest
The government has argued that the mandate furthers two
governmental interests-promoting the public health in general
and removing the barriers to economic advancement and political
and social integration that have historically plagued women."
Though the government probably has a compelling interest in
furthering both of those interests, all things being equal, the
mandate's numerous exemptions undermine those otherwise
compelling interests.
The Supreme Court has stated that "a law cannot be regarded
as protecting an interest of the highest order when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited. '" Under this standard, if a government policy leaves appreciable damage to an otherwise vital interest unprohibited, that
interest will not satisfy the compelling interest test. Furthermore,
the government must also show that it has a compelling interest
in the application of the rule to the particularplaintiffs challenging the mandate." 2 These cases suggest that-given the number
of exemptions to the mandate-the government will have difficulty proving that it has a compelling interest in enforcing the mandate against those who object to it on religious grounds.

359. Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-1635(RBW), 2012 WL 5817323,
at *10 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2012).
360. See id. at *15 (citations omitted).
361. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547
(1993) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
362. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
430-31 (2006) (citations omitted).
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The government will not enforce the mandate against every
employer's insurance plan because the mandate does not apply to
small employers or grandfathered plans. 63 Each of these exemptions leaves "appreciable damage" to the government's asserted
interests unprohibited, and therefore reduces the likelihood that
a court will find the government's interest compelling enough for
the purposes of RFRA. 4
The mandate only applies to employers with fifty or more fulltime employees.365 In a report on health reform for small businesses, the government states that the ACA's coverage provisions
will not apply to 5.8 million firms, or ninety-six percent of all employers in the United States, because those firms employ less
than fifty employees.366 This small employer exemption prevents
almost thirty-four million employees from being covered by the
mandate.36 7 This suggests that appreciable damage to those interests is left unprohibited by the mandate, undermining the government's asserted interests. By exempting small employers from
the mandate, the government has left millions of women uncovered by the mandate. None of the government's notices in the
Federal Register indicate why the government's interest in promoting the public health and the equality of women would not also be furthered by covering women employed by small employers.3 6 Likewise, critics of the religious exemption have not

363. Korte v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *1, *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 28,
2012).
364. Tyndale House Publishers,Inc., 2012 WL 5817323, at *17.
365. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2) (Supp. V 2011); Tyndale House Publishers,Inc., 2012 WL
5817323, at *17.
366. Health Reform for Small Business, THE WHITE HOUSE 1, http://www.white
house.gov/files/documents/health._reform for-smallbusinesses.pdf (last visited Apr. 18,
2013).
367. Id.
368. Cf. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 52-53, Korte v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., No. 12-3841 (7th Cir. Jan. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 431686 (arguing that the government "cannot explain how there is a compelling need to apply the Mandate to [for-profit]
[p]laintiffs when employers with fewer than fifty full-time employees (employing millions
of individuals) can avoid the Mandate ... there is no principled difference between an employer with approximately ninety full-time employees such as [plaintiff], which is subject
to the Mandate, and an employer with forty-nine full-time employees, which would not be
subject to the mandate"); Edward Whelan, The HHS ContraceptionMandate vs. the Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2179, 2188 (2012) (arguing that
"[i]f the government genuinely regarded marginally increased access to contraceptives to
be a compelling interest, what possible sense would it make to exempt grandfathered
plans from the obligation to provide insurance coverage for contraceptives?").
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addressed why the mandate should not also apply to small employers. The same state interests in promoting the public health
and the equality of women that mandate proponents so vehemently argue support applying the mandate to organizations regardless of an organization's religious views,... would seem to
weigh equally in favor of applying the mandate to small employers.
The grandfathered plan exception further undermines the government's purportedly compelling interest by leaving millions
more employees outside the mandate's coverage requirements.
Under the government's own mid-ranged estimates, "98 million
individuals will be enrolled in grandfathered group health plans
'
Even if the number of individuals in grandfathered
in 2013."37o
plans decreases as plans lose their grandfathered status, millions
of individuals will remain uncovered by the mandate solely on the
grounds that their plans are old enough to be grandfathered.
Though there are pragmatic reasons to exclude those plans from
the mandate's requirements, such as "easing the transition of the
healthcare industry into the reforms... by allowing for gradual
implementation," the reasonableness behind the government's
decision to exempt these plans does not alter the fact that the individuals covered by those plans will not receive the mandate's
protections.37 Accordingly, to the extent the mandate does not
apply to these plans, the government's interest in promoting the
public health and the equality of women is not furthered through
grandfathered plans. By grandfathering a significant number of
plans, the government has undermined its compelling interest in
promoting the public health and the equality of women by leaving
unprohibited plans that damage those interests.
Plaintiffs have already seized upon these factors to argue that
the mandate does not further a compelling interest. For example,
in a brief submitted to the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiffs in Korte

369. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 205, at 160-62.
370. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurane Issuers Relating
to Coverage of Preventive Services under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
75 Fed. Reg. 41,726, 41,732 (July 19 2010).
371. See Legatus v. Sebelius, No. 12-12061, 2012 WL 5359630, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Oct.
21, 2012). However, the government argued that it would be perverse to discourage Congress from considering the practical effects of an enactment by requiring it to enforce laws
immediately to preserve compelling interest status. See id.
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argued that the grandfathered plan exemption "leaves appreciable damage to the government's asserted interests untouched and
indicates the lack of any compelling need to apply the [m]andate
' Likewise, the plaintiffs in Sharpe Holdings
to [the] [p]laintiffs."372
underscored their view that the government could not meet its
burden under RFRA because the small employer and grandfathered plan "exceptions provided by the Act and mandate undermine the government's claim that such interests are compelCourts have been somewhat receptive to those
ling. '
arguments. 4
A number of district courts have preliminarily enjoined the
government from enforcing the mandate and, in doing so, have
recognized that plaintiffs will likely prevail on their RFRA claims
because the government has undermined its otherwise compelling
interests by exempting too many plans from the mandate."'
These courts have concluded that the government will likely fail
to meet its burden of showing that it has a compelling interest in
enforcing the mandate against the organizations that have raised
RFRA challenges. 76 These courts are correct because the government has left appreciable harm to the interests it has sought to
further through the mandate by exempting small employers and
grandfathered plans, and in doing so, has rendered its interests
no longer compelling.
The government will probably have an even greater difficulty
demonstrating that the mandate furthers a compelling interest
because many employers already provide coverage for contraceptives. Under the Court's decision in Yoder, for the government to
satisfy the compelling interest test, it must show that its inter' Even a decade before the manests are "not otherwise served."377
date, roughly nine out of ten employer-sponsored health insur-

372. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 51, Korte, 2013 WL 431686.
373. Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 2:12-CV-92DDN, 2012 WL 6738489, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2012).
374. Id.; see also Legatus, 2012 WL 5359630, at *10; Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v.
Sebelius, No. 12-1635 (RBW), 2012 WL 5817323, at *17 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2012).
375. See, e.g., Sharpe Holdings, 2012 WL 6738489, at *5-6; Korte v. Sebelius, No. 123841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *2-5 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012).
376. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2012 WL 6738476, at *5-6, *8 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 30, 2012); Tyndale House Publishers,Inc., 2012 WL 5817323, at *18; Newland
v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1297 (D. Colo. 2012).
377. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
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ance plans covered the full-range of contraceptive measures.
Furthermore, the number of individuals covered by contraceptives has tended to increase over time." ' These two factors combine to suggest that at least ninety percent of employer health insurance plans covered contraceptives before the government
promulgated the mandate. Accordingly, the mandate will only
marginally increase the number of plans that cover contraceptives because most plans already do. Moreover, by exempting
grandfathered plans and small employers from the mandate, the
government has even further reduced the likely number of individuals who will gain access to contraceptive coverage solely because of the mandate. The marginal size of the mandate's increase in contraceptive coverage might indicate that interest is
"otherwise served" without the mandate, and therefore, it reduces
the likelihood that the mandate furthers a compelling government interest.38 °
In short, the number of exceptions to the mandate and the limited increase in contraceptive coverage the mandate will enable
make it unlikely that the government will be able to overcome the
high barrier imposed by RFRA's compelling interest test.
3. The Least Restrictive Means Prong: A Closer Question
Assuming the government can show that it has a compelling
interest in promulgating the mandate-a dubious propositionthe government will then have to show that the mandate is the
least restrictive means of achieving that interest.3 8' To make this
showing, the government must, at minimum, prove that the alternative methods the opposing parties have presented are not
viable. 82 If the government can meet that burden, a court will
find that the mandate meets the least restrictive means prong. 3s
At this stage, most courts have not determined whether the

378. Adam Sonfield et al., U.S. Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives and the Impact of
Contraceptive Coverage Mandates, 2002, 36 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 72, 78
(2004).
379. See id. at 72.
380. See supranotes 246-51 and accompanying text.
381. See supra Section IV.A.
382. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
383. See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011).
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plaintiffs will likely be able to succeed on the least restrictive
means prong of the RFRA compelling interest test because they
have either concluded that the government lacks a compelling interest to support the mandate or that the plaintiffs' have not
made the threshold showing that the mandate substantially burTherefore, an assessment of
dens their religious exercise.
whether the mandate meets the least restrictive means prong is
speculative at best. Nevertheless, a few words can be said about
whether the mandate is less restrictive than some of the alternatives put forward by those contesting the mandate.
RFRA plaintiffs have alleged two prominent alternatives to the
mandate: the government could offer incentives to employers who
provide the contraceptive coverage-as opposed to punishing
those that do not provide the services-or the government could
provide the contraceptive services directly.385 One scholar has
made similar suggestions."' The mandate is almost certainly
more restrictive than those two proffered alternatives.
If the government simply incentivized providing contraceptives, the government would place a lower burden on religious objectors than under the mandate. Rewarding those organizations
that provided contraceptives, as opposed to punishing those that
did not, would arguably eliminate the burden on the organizations that refused to provide the contraceptives because it would
lack the coercive threat of fines imposed under the current mandate system. Religious groups might remain displeased with the
government's decision to promote contraceptive coverage; however, their free exercise would not be burdened because they would
not be required to themselves facilitate or encourage contraceptive coverage.

384. See, e.g., Grote Indus. v. Sebelius, No. 4:12-cv-00134-SEB-DML, 2012 WL
6725905, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2012) (concluding that the court need not evaluate
whether the plaintiffs were likely to succeed under the compelling interest test because
plaintiffs were not likely to be able to show a substantial burden on their free exercise);
Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-1635(RBW), 2012 WL 5817323, at *18
(D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2012) (determining that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on establishing
that the government lacked a compelling interest and therefore not considering the least
restrictive means prong).
385. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2012 WL 6739476, at *6 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 30, 2012).
386. See Whelan, supra note 368, at 2186.
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Likewise, if the government itself provided contraceptive coverage to the employees of religious objectors, the government
would diminish the burden on those objectors. The employer
might be dissatisfied with the government's policy, but the provision of contraceptive coverage would not impinge upon the employer's religious beliefs because the government would be responsible for providing the coverage instead of the employer.
Though, at first glance, the challengers' proffered alternatives
are less restrictive than the mandate, it is not clear that they
would be viable alternatives." 7 The government can satisfy
RFRA's least restrictive means prong if it can refute these alternatives."' The additional number of individuals covered under a
system that incentivized contraceptive coverage, as opposed to
the mandate's sanctioning non-coverage, might not be significant.
Most insurance plans already cover contraceptives.8 8 To the extent that plans without contraceptive coverage do not provide
that coverage because of religious opposition by the employer, the
number of religiously-motivated employers who would cover contraceptives in response to government incentives might be fairly
low depending upon the strength of those employers' religious
convictions. Furthermore, if the incentives are paid out to all
those who cover contraceptives, including the ninety percent of
plans that do currently, the cost of those incentives might make
them prohibitively expensive. On the other hand, the government
might make the incentives minimal; however, employers with
strong religious convictions would not likely respond to such a
minimal incentive. The incentive alternative might not be able to
achieve as significant an increase in contraceptive coverage as the
mandate, and therefore might be an alternative the government
can refute.
The most common alternative to the mandate plaintiffs have
proposed is government provision of, or funding for, contraceptives.39 ° The plaintiffs have a decent argument that the govern-

387. See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
388. See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011).
389. See Sonfield et al., supra note 378, at 72, 78.
390. See, e.g., Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 2:12CV-92-DDN, 2012 WL 6738489, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 3012); Monaghan, 2012 WL
6738476, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2012); Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287,
1298 (D. Colo. 2012).
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ment itself could provide contraception coverage to employees of
employers with religious objections to the mandate because the
government already provides contraceptive coverage to some
women: In 2006, more than nine million women received publiclyfunded contraception coverage.3 9' Presumably, the government
would impose less of a burden on some employers' religious exercise by expanding this public coverage, as opposed to mandating
that the employer provide a plan covering contraceptives. 9 2 Indeed, one court has already concluded that the government was
unlikely to meet its burden of refuting this alternative. 9 3 That
court emphasized that "the current existence of analogous programs heavily weighs against" the government's argument that it
could not provide coverage for contraceptives as an alternative to
requiring employers to do SO. 3" That court's decision indicates
that at least some courts will probably find that the mandate fails
RFRA's least restrictive means prong when they finally reach the
merits of these cases.
Nonetheless, although the government already funds contraceptive coverage for many women, the government might be able
to refute this alternative to the mandate by arguing that it would
be too expensive to expand that coverage. In 2010, public expenditures on contraceptive coverage totaled $2.37 billion, eighty-eight
percent of which the federal government funded. 9' Expanding
federally-funded contraceptive coverage would require an increase in this federal funding. Whether the government could afford such an increase is a tough question. The United States has
witnessed a number of fiscal policymaking battles in recent years,
which are likely to continue into 2013.396 Moreover, Congress is

391. See Facts on Publicly Funded Contraceptive Services in the United States,
GUTTMACHER INST. (May 2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb-contraceptive-serv.
html.
392. Though the mandate does not require anyone to provide contraceptives, it fines
those that do not, creating an effective requirement that certain employers provide coverage. See supra Section II.A.
393. Newland, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1289-99.
394. Id. at 1299.
395. See Adam Sonfield & Rachel Benson Gold, Public Fundingfor Family Planning,
Sterilization and Abortion Services, FY 1980-2010, GUTMACHER INST. 5, 8 (Mar. 2012),
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/Public-Funding-FP-2010.pdf.
396. See Damian Paletta, Fresh Budget Fights Brewing-Markets Breathe Sigh of Relief After Fiscal Clash, but Tax-and-Cut Battles Loom, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2013, at Al.
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sharply divided on the mandate.3 97 In the face of severe budgetary
constraints and given the controversy associated with contraceptives, it is unlikely that policymakers would agree to increase
federal funding for contraceptives as an alternative to the mandate.
The government will bear the burden of refuting the alternatives to the mandate that the plaintiffs have offered.39 Though
the government might be able to raise questions about whether
those alternatives are viable, it is not clear how courts will resolve those questions at this time. Nevertheless, by placing the
burden of proof on the government, RFRA will make it more difficult for the government to satisfy RFRA's least restrictive means
element.3 99 At least one court has determined that the government
will not likely be able to meet its burden under the compelling interest test,4 °0 providing an indication of the important role the
burden of proof will play in future RFRA challenges. When courts
eventually address the merits of plaintiffs' RFRA claims against
the mandate, the fact that the government has the burden of
proof in disproving the alternatives presented by the plaintiff
might be determinative when there is conflicting evidence of
whether an alternative design is feasible. In such a case, even if
the government can show that the mandate furthers a compelling
interest, the plaintiffs might win their case because the government cannot satisfy the least restrictive means prong.
V. CONCLUSION

This comment has attempted to provide an introduction to the
mandate and the legal challenges to it.
At this stage, uncertainty surrounds the mandate. Only one
district court has adjudicated the merits of a claim that the mandate violates RFRA, and the courts of appeals have yet to address
the substance of the mandate. Furthermore, the contours of the
mandate might change as a result of the administrative process

397. See Erik Eckholm, Poll Finds Divisions over Requiring Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 2012, at A15.
398. See supranotes 254-55 and accompanying text.
399. See supranotes 254-55 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
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that the government initiated through the ANPRM and the February 1, 2013 proposed rules. Nonetheless, courts will undoubtedly be forced to further grapple with the mandate and its validity
because the mandate implicates divisive issues, religious freedom
and women's access to contraceptives. Both the U.S. Senate and
everyday Americans are closely split on whether the government
should impose the mandate.401 The high-profile debate over the
mandate and the staunchness of the mandate's supporters and
detractors create a strong possibility that cases challenging the
mandate will remain on the dockets of courts throughout the
United States. Given the prominence of the isue, if the courts
continue to reach conflicting decisions over the mandate, it would
not be surprising if the Supreme Court decided to resolve the issues the mandate has created.4 °2
One scholar has suggested that the question for policymakers
is which harm they should avoid in balancing increasing access to
contraceptives with religious liberty 03 However, Congress has already made that determination. Under RFRA, religious liberty
must win out in any battle between policies if the competing policy cannot satisfy the compelling interest test. The mandate is an
example of one such competing policy. As this comment has argued, the mandate infringes upon the religious freedom of both
nonprofit and for-profit corporations alike, and therefore, it must
satisfy the compelling interest test. Though the Court has not yet
held that a for-profit corporation can exercise religion, the similarities between for-profit corporations and nonprofit corporations
suggest that the former entities can exercise religion as much as
the latter. Mandate litigation remains in its infancy. Nevertheless, even at this stage, it is apparent that the government will
not be able to satisfy RFRA's exacting standard. The number of
exemptions to the mandate will make it difficult for the government to prove that it furthers a compelling interest, and the least
restrictive means test will only add to this difficulty. Striking
down the mandate will undoubtedly lead to great consternation
among its supporters. Nonetheless, the mandate violates RFRA

401. See Eckholm, supra note 397.
402. See, e.g., Bronner, supra note 223; Denniston, supranote 108; Louise Radnofsky &
Jess Bravin, Latest Birth Control Offer 'FallsShort,'WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2013, at A3.
403. Wilson, supra note 126, at 1505.
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in its current form. If the mandate's supporters have a quarrel
with anyone, it should be with Congress for enacting RFRA, and
not those who have exercised their rights under that statute.
RFRA has stacked the deck against the mandate. It cannot surmount that obstacle.
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